Letting go and holding on: The politics of performance management in the United Kingdom

Matthews, Felicity

doi:10.1177/0952076715615186

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Further, the drivers of those styles combine to produce continuous dilemmas within government, in which ministers juggle their need to appear to be in control, to defend their record in elections and to Parliament, with their need to pragmatic and share policymaking responsibility to get things done (Gains and Stoker, 2009;Hay, 2009;Matthews, 2016). Formal institutions are central to the official story, while the informal "rules of the game" facilitate policy behind the scenes.…”

Section: The Policymaking Context: Who Makes Uk Government Policy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The UK Government’s COVID-19 Policy: What Does “Guided by the Science” Mean in Practice?

Cairney

2021

Front. Polit. Sci.

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UK government ministers state that their COVID-19 policy is “guided by the science.” In practice they mean “our scientists,” and initial UK government policy was highly consistent with that advice. Ministers formed strong relationships with key scientific advisors, relied on evidence from their Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), and ignored or excluded many other sources. I explore two types of lesson from this experience. First, UK studies of interest groups help explain the politics of expert advice. They show that the minister-adviser relationship is conditional on the ways in which the UK government assigns status to particular sources of science advice, and the willingness of those advisers to follow the “rules of the game,” within a wider political and policymaking context. Second, documentary analysis of SAGE minutes and meeting papers, and analysis of oral evidence to key House of Commons committees, shows high consistency between SAGE advice and UK government policy in the run up to lockdown. Ministers relied on their advisers to define the policy problem and identify feasible solutions throughout this period, while their advisors supported government policy and the right of ministers to make it. This new experience reflects and reinforces longstanding evidence from policy community studies: some experts remain core insiders if they advise on policies that they do not necessarily support, while outsiders have the freedom to criticize the policy they were unable to influence.

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Section: The Policymaking Context: Who Makes Uk Government Policy?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The UK Government’s COVID-19 Policy: What Does “Guided by the Science” Mean in Practice?

Cairney

2021

Front. Polit. Sci.

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“…Their need to hold on, to live up to an electoral imperative, and respond to parliamentary scrutiny by telling a story of their success. Or, some might believe that they could control government if they tried (Hay, 2009;Matthews, 2016).…”

Section: The Westminster Model's Story Of Central Government Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

The myth of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a decentred state

Cairney

2020

Public Policy and Administration

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I describe a policy theory story in which a decentred state results from choice and necessity. Governments often choose not to centralise policymaking but they would not succeed if they tried. Many policy scholars take this story for granted, but it is often ignored in other academic disciplines and wider political debate. Instead, commentators call for more centralisation to deliver more accountable, 'rational', and 'evidence based' policymaking. Such contradictory arguments, about the feasibility and value of government centralisation, raise an ever-present dilemma for governments to accept or challenge decentring. They also accentuate a modern dilemma about how to seek 'evidence-based policymaking' in a decentred state. I identify three ideal-type ways in which governments can address both dilemmas consistently. I then identify their ad hoc use by UK and Scottish governments. Although each government has a reputation for more or less centralist approaches, both face similar dilemmas and address them in similar ways. Their choices reflect their need to appear to be in control while dealing with the fact that they are not.

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“…Performance management aims for the integration of other steering methods. It is linked to strengthened political control in the overall state machinery, and specifically to the implementation of inter-sectorial policies and the government programme (Peters 2018;Murto 2016;Matthews 2016). In this respect, it is also an instrument for democratic control of arts expenditure-to align the goals of the government representing the people's will with those who benefit from that system (cf.…”

Section: Cultural Policy and Art Councils As A Part Of Public Policy mentioning

confidence: 99%

Results-based steering as a tool for centralizedart policy management and instrumentalization? Analysis of the Finnish ArtsCouncil’s reformation

Jakonen¹

2020

NKT

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Letting go and holding on: The politics of performance management in the United Kingdom

Cited by 14 publications

References 46 publications

The UK Government’s COVID-19 Policy: What Does “Guided by the Science” Mean in Practice?

The UK Government’s COVID-19 Policy: What Does “Guided by the Science” Mean in Practice?

The myth of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a decentred state

Results-based steering as a tool for centralizedart policy management and instrumentalization? Analysis of the Finnish ArtsCouncil’s reformation

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