Inaction and reaction – Coalition government and constitutional reform in the United Kingdom

Abstract

Constitutional reform in the United Kingdom is a story frequently framed around the narratives of missed opportunities, executive intransigence and institutional stickiness. Yet in times of flux and uncertainty, matters of the constitution can scale the political agenda at breakneck speed; and as the architecture of the UK teeters on the precipice of potentially fundamental upheaval, it is crucial to locate recent events within the broader history of constitutional reform in order to tease apart the dynamics of stasis and change. This article responds by offering the first complete in-depth analysis of the 2010-15 Coalition Government's record on the constitution, focusing on the gap between rhetoric and reform, and the way in which constitutional traditions have confounded the ability to effectively manage the tensions that exist within the UK's uneasy settlement. In doing so, the article sets out the institutional and ideational factors that have influenced attitudes towards constitutional reform, in particular focusing on the way in which dilemmas of office have confounded meaningful attempts to alter Britain's constitutional fabric. It argues that three critical factors together explain the Coalition's record on the constitution: the clash of constitutional philosophies within the Coalition; the dilemmas with which the Liberal Democrats were confronted in the transition from opposition to government; and, the extent to which the governing norms of constitution effectively neuter attempts to its reform. The findings of this article are therefore salient and significant, providing valuable lessons regarding the tenability of the UK's extant constitutional architecture and the capacity of the Conservative Government to successfully manage and vent the myriad of pressures upon it.Key words: constitution; constitutional reform; coalition government; institutions; ideology 2 Matters of the constitution in the United Kingdom (UK) were once renowned for the sheer paucity of popular and political interest, earning the issue of constitutional reform the unfortunate label of 'a topic for anoraks ' (Bogdanor, 2014). Yet in times of flux and uncertainty, matters of the constitution can scale the political agenda at breakneck speed. This has been readily apparent in recent months as the implications of the 'no' vote in the Scottish independence referendum unfolded and precipitated a range of constitutional conundrums regarding the asymmetry of the Union, which has led commentators to argue that 'the tangled British constitution is again on the verge of significant, unplanned change' (The Times, 2014). Indeed, constitutional affairs were centre-stage in the run-up to the 2015 general election, the debate being dominated by issues including Scotland's relationship with Westminster and Britain's place in Europe; and the newly elected Conservative Government has pledged a package of reforms that could simultaneously witness the repatriation of sovereignty and the dispersal of power across the Union. As the architectur...

Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of coalition governance

“…Yet whilst these studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of the -in-that structure the inter-election period, we still know relatively little about their relevance to the everyday practice of coalition governance. Indeed, one of the critical insights of neo-institutional scholarship is the -in--in- Ostrom, 2005 , 2003: 4, 33); and that the dilemmas which can arise w (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 36; see also Marsh and Hall, 2016;Matthews, 2015;Turnbull, 2016). Instead, the challenge for those who seek to explain the operation of coalition government is to unpack the relationships that exist between macro-level institutions, meso-level values and micro-level practices.…”

“…Nor does a focus on traditions and norms assume that they are unconsciously inherited or unquestioningly maintained. Indeed, an important strand of interpretivist scholarship has argued that traditions are ‘contingent, produced by the actions of individuals’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 4, 33), and that the dilemmas which can arise when a ‘new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices’ may force a ‘reconsideration of these existing beliefs and associated traditions’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 36; see also Marsh and Hall, 2016; Matthews, 2015; Turnbull, 2016). Instead, the challenge for those who seek to explain the operation of coalition government is to unpack the relationships that exist between macro-level institutions, meso-level values and micro-level practices.…”

“…First, it responds to the demand for situated analyses of coalition governance (Martin and Stephenson, 2001; Müller et al, 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003a), and by providing critical insights from the United Kingdom, makes an important empirical contribution to extant comparative scholarship, which has largely focused on the ‘consensual’ (Lijphart, 2012) democracies of western Europe (see Andeweg et al, 2011; Müller et al, 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003c). Second, it dovetails with a burgeoning body of literature that examines how political actors have mediated the ‘dilemmas’ arising from clashes between constitutional traditions, institutional rules and governing reality (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Marsh and Hall, 2016; Matthews, 2015; Turnbull, 2016). Third, its findings provide further impetus for the emerging scholarly turn towards ‘informal governance’, and the focus on the interplay between formal ‘frontstage’ posturing and informal ‘backstage’ accommodation in governance transactions (see for example Ayres et al, 2017; Friedman, 1995; Klijn, 2014).…”

Whose Mandate is it Anyway? Brexit, the Constitution and the Contestation of Authority

“…The net effect of this is a pattern of 'constitution-by-consent', equipping the electorate with a powerful voiceeven veto-player capacity-in relation to key constitutional decisions. 11 Indeed, referendums have an important anticipatory power, as politicians react to avert an unwanted outcome, as illustrated by the Coalition's kneejerk response to the gathering nationalist support during the Scottish independence referendum campaign.…”

Letting go and holding on: The politics of performance management in the United Kingdom

“…Together, the strands of scholarship reviewed in this section combine to develop an important argument regarding the inescapable effect of the overarching politico-administrative context on performance management; and, in turn, the utility of adopting an institutional lens to examine the dynamics of this relationship. In case of the UK, this lens directs attention to the way in which Westminster majoritarianism gives rise to a set of institutional norms regarding the balance of power between core and periphery (see Lijphart, 1999, 2012; Matthews, 2013, 2015); and provides a potential explanation for the persistence of a top-down, highly interventionist approach to performance management. The following sections interrogate this further by focusing on the politics of performance management in terms of governing incentives and institutional norms; and in doing so highlights the prevailing disconnect that exists between the ‘talk’ and ‘action’ of both the Labour and Coalition governments.…”