This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two content providers (CPs). Competition between two CPs is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and the credibility of content they offer. According to the CPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both CPs are bounded rational. Each CP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamical system induced by bounded rationality, and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.

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In this paper, we have studied the impact of customer confusion on the decision-making strategies of Internet service providers (ISP) in the network and telecommunications market. This confusion may come from several factors, e.g. incomplete information on the offer, non-transparent advertising, the ability of the analysis, etc.; but that sure varies over time since yesterday’s customer is no longer today’s. In this work, we have developed a simple oligopolistic model, using non-cooperative game theory, to formalize the interactions between service providers and end-users by considering that the rationality of customers varies over time. We assessed the impact of the dynamics of consumer confusion on the competition and profitability of service providers who are considered rational and competitive with one another to maximize their respective gains in the face of a confused fraction of consumers while others are not confused. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, we have shown that when the number of confused customers is large, the ISP is interested in that and they offer moderately high prices with low quality of service. On the other hand, over time, rationality increases, forcing the ISPs to change their strategies by offering better services so that their demand increases. We also add that when customer behavior changes quickly, the ISPs follow clearer strategies with customer satisfactory services.

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The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a communication platform is of great practical significance in the wireless communications field. This paper studies the activity scheduling of unmanned aerial vehicles acting as aerial base stations in an area of interest for a specific period. Specifically, competition among multiple UAVs is explored, and a game model for the competition is developed. The Nash equilibrium of the game model is then analyzed. Based on the analysis, an algorithm for Nash equilibrium computation is proposed. Then, a game model with fairness concern is established, and its equilibrium price is also analyzed. In addition, numerical examples are conducted to determine the factors that affect the strategies (price, quality of service, and beaconing duration) of the UAV and to show how the expected profits of UAVs change with that fairness concern point. The authors believe that this research paper will shed light on the application of UAV as a flying base station.

This paper examines the economic utilities in a two-way market where content delivery network (CDN) providers charge content providers (CPs) for distribution of contents to end-users. The authors offer new models that involve CPs, CDN providers and end users and formulate interactions between CPs and CDN providers as a non-cooperative game after bargaining on some common decision parameters. After formulating the game and theoretically studying the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, numerical analysis shows that negotiation is an exceptional solution to fight against the marginalization of the decision that can behave in CPs or CDNs. In terms of profit, the authors have shown that when the bargaining game exists the two actors share the gain and that allows them survival in the market.

We propose in this paper an investigation of the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two Internet services providers (ISPs). The competition between them is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and their number of cached items. According to the ISPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both ISPs are bounded rational. Each ISP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamic system induced by bounded rationality and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.

No abstract