This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two content providers (CPs). Competition between two CPs is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and the credibility of content they offer. According to the CPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both CPs are bounded rational. Each CP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamical system induced by bounded rationality, and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.
Network neutrality has been a very sensitive topic of discussion all over the world. In this paper, we study the competition between ISPs under two-regime non-neutral network and neutral network. We interpret non-neutral network when an internet service provider is privileged by the Content Provider (CP) in order to propose a high quality of service for a given content. Competition among ISPs modeled as a Cournot game. Noncooperative game is utilized to study the interactions among ISPs. On the one hand, each ISP decide his policies of Quality of Service (QoS) in order to maximize his profit. In turn, the end-users demand for the service of an ISP depends not only on their strategies, but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. A unique Nash equilibrium is established, through rigorous mathematical analysis. Furthermore, we introduce a learning algorithm that may lead ISPs to learn their strategic QoS in a complete distributed manner. In order to quantify how efficient is the Nash equilibrium point, a detailed analysis of the Price of Anarchy is adopted to ensure the performance of the system at equilibrium. Extensive simulations show the convergence to the Nash equilibrium and give some insights on how the game parameters may vary the ISPs revenue, demand and policies.
In this paper, we have studied the impact of customer confusion on the decision-making strategies of Internet service providers (ISP) in the network and telecommunications market. This confusion may come from several factors, e.g. incomplete information on the offer, non-transparent advertising, the ability of the analysis, etc.; but that sure varies over time since yesterday’s customer is no longer today’s. In this work, we have developed a simple oligopolistic model, using non-cooperative game theory, to formalize the interactions between service providers and end-users by considering that the rationality of customers varies over time. We assessed the impact of the dynamics of consumer confusion on the competition and profitability of service providers who are considered rational and competitive with one another to maximize their respective gains in the face of a confused fraction of consumers while others are not confused. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, we have shown that when the number of confused customers is large, the ISP is interested in that and they offer moderately high prices with low quality of service. On the other hand, over time, rationality increases, forcing the ISPs to change their strategies by offering better services so that their demand increases. We also add that when customer behavior changes quickly, the ISPs follow clearer strategies with customer satisfactory services.
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