Towards a Predictive Analysis of UAV-Based Flying Base Station Decisions

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

et al. 2022

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We propose in this paper an investigation of the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two Internet services providers (ISPs). The competition between them is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and their number of cached items. According to the ISPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both ISPs are bounded rational. Each ISP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamic system induced by bounded rationality and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.

“…e third term v j (N − k j )B j is the bandwidth cost. e quality of service q s j defined as the expected delay is computed by the Kleinrock function (see [50,51]):…”

Section: Demand Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Chaotic Dynamics Duopoly Game of ISPs Bounded Rational

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

et al. 2022

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“…Assumption 1 means that the effect of provider policies on its demand is greater than the effect of the policies of its opponent on its demand function [24,35]. Assumption 1 will be used to prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Problem Modelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers

Mobile Information Systems

et al. 2021

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With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers’ policies.

“…Model. D ij is the average demand of end-users who connect to the CP i through the ISP j which depends on content access price p c i , credibility c i , network access price p s j , QoS q s j , and cache access price p cc j (see [31][32][33]). e demand D ij depends also on prices p c − i , credibilities c − i , prices p s − j , prices p cc − j , and QoS set by the opponents.…”

Section: Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks

Mobile Information Systems

et al. 2020

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Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution.