Analysis of Bargaining Game Policy in the Internet Content Distribution Chain

Abstract

This paper examines the economic utilities in a two-way market where content delivery network (CDN) providers charge content providers (CPs) for distribution of contents to end-users. The authors offer new models that involve CPs, CDN providers and end users and formulate interactions between CPs and CDN providers as a non-cooperative game after bargaining on some common decision parameters. After formulating the game and theoretically studying the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, numerical analysis shows that negotiation is an exceptional solution to fight against the marginalization of the decision that can behave in CPs or CDNs. In terms of profit, the authors have shown that when the bargaining game exists the two actors share the gain and that allows them survival in the market.

Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers

“…Demand Model. D fk is the demand of end-users for the content provided by CP f and transferred by ISP k which is a function of content access price p c f , credibility of content c f , network access price p s k , and QoS q s k (see [33,34]).…”

A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market

“…Game theory has been applied to a wide range of networking problems to study the interaction of players seeking to maximize their profit [15]. The authors [16] study models that involve CPs, CDN providers and end-users. The authors formulate interactions among CPs and and among CDN as a non-cooperative game.…”

Distributed and Fair Beacon Power and Beaconing Rate Adaptation Based on Game Theoretic Approach for Connected Vehicles

“…Several work used game theory in wireless networks (Outanoute et al 2019) (Omar et al 2019a) (Omar et al 2019b) (Garmani et al 2019) (Garmani et al 2018) (Ait Omar et al 2019. The authors in (Le et al 2011) introduced a beacon power control algorithm.…”