Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication --mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy. A Revolution in Thinking and PracticePrior to the 1990s, central banks were shrouded in mystery-and believed they should be. Conventional wisdom in central banking circles held that monetary policymakers should say as little as possible, and say it cryptically. In 1981, Karl Brunner (1981 wrote, with evident sarcasm:Central Banking… thrives on a pervasive impression that [it]… is an esoteric art. Access to this art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words and sentences.Fifteen years later, in his 1996 Robbins lectures at the London School of Economics, one of the authors of this paper (Alan Blinder (1998) Greater openness might actually improve the efficiency of monetary policy… [because] expectations about future central bank behavior provide the essential link between short rates and long rates. A more open central bank… naturally conditions expectations by providing the markets with more information about its own view of the fundamental factors guiding monetary policy…, thereby creating a virtuous circle. By making itself more predictable to the markets, the central bank makes market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. And that makes it possible to do a better job of managing the economy.,Five years later, Michael Woodford (2001, pp. 307 and 312) the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of England. Section 4 reviews the first strand of empirical research mentioned above, and Section 5 discusses the second. Finally, Section 6 provides our answers to the question of how central bank communication can contribute to the effectiveness of monetary policy and identifies avenues for future research. Why does central bank communication matter? TheoryCentral bank communication can be defined as the provision of information by the central bank to the public regarding such matters as the objectives of monetary policy, the monetary policy strategy, the economic outlook, and the outlook for future policy decisions.Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the ability of a central bank to affect the economy depends critically on its ability to influence market exp...

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication—mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks’ macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.

No abstract

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in Working Paper SeriesNecessity as the mother of invention: monetary policy after the crisis Alan Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Jakob de Haan, David-Jan JansenDisclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. No 2 / 2017MONETARY POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS Abstract:We ask whether recent changes in monetary policy due to the financial crisis will be temporary or permanent. We present evidence from two surveys-one of central bank governors, the other of academic specialists. We find that central banks in crisis countries are more likely to have resorted to new policies, to have had discussions about mandates, and to have communicated more. But the thinking has changed more broadly-for instance, central banks in non-crisis countries also report having implemented macro-prudential measures. Overall, we expect central banks in the future to have broader mandates, use macro-prudential tools more widely, and communicate more actively than before the crisis. While there is no consensus yet about the usefulness of unconventional monetary policies, we expect most of them will remain in central banks' toolkits, as governors who gain experience with a particular tool are more likely to assess that tool positively.

When does the general public lose trust in banks? We provide empirical evidence using responses by Dutch survey participants to eight hypothetical scenarios. We find that members of the general public care strongly about executive compensation. Negative media reports, falling stock prices, and opaque product information also affect trust in banks. Experiencing a bank bailout leads to less concern about government intervention, while experience of a bank failure leads to greater concern on bonuses.

This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After briefly examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice of hard versus soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the USA. The main argument of the paper is that the Pact's enforcement mechanisms are too weak. It is also argued that big countries are less likely to adhere to the fiscal policy rules in place. Reform of the Pact should aim at stricter, instead of more flexible, rules and should not rely on cyclically adjusted deficit estimates.

No abstract