This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are discussed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In 1999, eleven European countries formed the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); they abandoned their national currencies and adopted a new common currency, the euro. Several recent papers argue that the introduction of the euro has led (by itself) to a sizable and statistically significant increase in trade between the member countries of EMU. In this paper, we put the trade effect of the euro in historical perspective. We argue that the creation of the EMU was a continuation (or culmination) of a series of previous policy changes that have led over the last five decades to greater economic integration among the countries that now constitute EMU. Using a data set that includes 22 industrial countries from 1948 to 2003, we find strong evidence of a gradual increase in trade intensity between European countries. Once we control for this trend in trade integration, the euro's impact on trade disappears. Moreover, a significant part of the trend in European trade integration is explained by measurable policy changes. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: F02, F15, F33.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 128 countries over the period 1972-1998. Our results, based on Extreme Bounds Analysis, suggest that it are mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits.

Just like private companies depend crucially on their ability to reach customers, policymakers must communicate with private agents to be successful-and much of this communication is channeled through the media. This is especially true for central banks, which need to build credibility among the general public. This paper analyses how favorably the print media report about the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy decisions. Favorableness is, inter alia, influenced by the amount of information communicated by the ECB. There are, however, also indications of a critical monitoring role of the media, which reports more negatively when inflation exceeds the inflation target.JEL codes: E52, E58

WPI021l75The likely enlargement of euro-area membership will radically change the environment under which monetary policy will be made in the euro area. Within less than a decade, the number of member countries in the curo area could more than double, with the vast majority of accession countries being relatively small in economic terms, compared with current members. Absent reforms, such a significant but asymmetric expansion could impede the effectiveness of the institutional policymaking process of the European Central Bank (ECB) and be seen by some as resulting in the overrepresentation of small member countries in the ECB Council. The paper illustrates these issues, describes the principles on which refonDs of the ECB statute could build, and discusses four specific institutional reform scenarios. The analysis coincides with the ECB Council being scheduled to present suggestions for reform by late 2002.