Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication --mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy. A Revolution in Thinking and PracticePrior to the 1990s, central banks were shrouded in mystery-and believed they should be. Conventional wisdom in central banking circles held that monetary policymakers should say as little as possible, and say it cryptically. In 1981, Karl Brunner (1981 wrote, with evident sarcasm:Central Banking… thrives on a pervasive impression that [it]… is an esoteric art. Access to this art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words and sentences.Fifteen years later, in his 1996 Robbins lectures at the London School of Economics, one of the authors of this paper (Alan Blinder (1998) Greater openness might actually improve the efficiency of monetary policy… [because] expectations about future central bank behavior provide the essential link between short rates and long rates. A more open central bank… naturally conditions expectations by providing the markets with more information about its own view of the fundamental factors guiding monetary policy…, thereby creating a virtuous circle. By making itself more predictable to the markets, the central bank makes market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. And that makes it possible to do a better job of managing the economy.,Five years later, Michael Woodford (2001, pp. 307 and 312) the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of England. Section 4 reviews the first strand of empirical research mentioned above, and Section 5 discusses the second. Finally, Section 6 provides our answers to the question of how central bank communication can contribute to the effectiveness of monetary policy and identifies avenues for future research. Why does central bank communication matter? TheoryCentral bank communication can be defined as the provision of information by the central bank to the public regarding such matters as the objectives of monetary policy, the monetary policy strategy, the economic outlook, and the outlook for future policy decisions.Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the ability of a central bank to affect the economy depends critically on its ability to influence market exp...

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. Terms of use: Documents in JORGE MARTÍNEZ-PAGÉS, E U R O P E A N C E N T R A L B A N K W O R K I N G PA P E R S E R I E S E U R O S Y S T E M

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The paper assesses the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank and their effectiveness. We find that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision-making process. The paper shows that the Federal Reserve has been pursuing a highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision making, while the Bank of England is using a collegial communication strategy and highly individualistic decision making. The European Central Bank (ECB) has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision making. Assessing these strategies, we find that predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good for the Federal Reserve and the ECB. This suggests that there may not be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication strategy. Copyright 2007 The Ohio State University.

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication—mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks’ macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.

In 2005 all ECB publications will feature a motif taken from the €50 banknote. WO R K I N G PA P E R S E R I E S N O. 4 5 2 / M A R C H 2 0 0 5This paper can be downloaded without charge from http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=676403. STOCKS, BONDS, MONEY MARKETS AND EXCHANGE RATES MEASURING C O N T E N T S Abstract 4Non-technical summary 5

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the U.S. and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries' economic fundamentals. This confirms the "wake-up call" hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country-specific characteristics during the crisis. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JEL No.: F3, G14, G15Keywords: contagion; financial crisis; equity markets; global transmission; market integration; country risk; factor model; financial policies; FX reserves, current account (Paris, 2012), Q-Group, (Tampa, 2012), and at the EMG-ESRC Workshop on Global Linkages and Financial Crises (Cass Business School, London, 2012) for comments on earlier versions of the paper, as well as Assaf Shtauber and Tadios Tewolde for helpful research assistance. Detailed comments from two anonymous referees and the acting editor (Bernard Dumas) also greatly improved the paper. The views expressed in this paper are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Bank of Canada. 1Ever since the seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990) following the global October 1987 stock market crash, the international finance literature has studied how shocks are transmitted across borders.Words with negative connotations such as "volatility spillovers" (e.g., Engle, Ito and Lin (1990);Masulis, Hamao and Ng (1990)) and "contagion" have been coined to indicate shock transmission that cannot be explained by fundamentals or co-movements that are viewed as "excessive." Countless papers have been written proposing quantitative measures of contagion (see Karolyi (2003); Dungey et al. (2004), for surveys) or developing theories to explain it (e.g., Allen and Gale (2000)).The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 has arguably been the first truly major global crisis since the Great Depression of 1929 to 1932. While the crisis initially had its origin in the United States in a relatively small segment of the lending market, the sub-prime mortgage market, it rapidly spread across virtually all economies, both advanced and emerging, as well as across economic sectors. It also affected equity markets worldwide, with many countries experi...

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the U.S. and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries' economic fundamentals. This confirms the "wake-up call" hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country-specific characteristics during the crisis. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JEL No.: F3, G14, G15Keywords: contagion; financial crisis; equity markets; global transmission; market integration; country risk; factor model; financial policies; FX reserves, current account (Paris, 2012), Q-Group, (Tampa, 2012), and at the EMG-ESRC Workshop on Global Linkages and Financial Crises (Cass Business School, London, 2012) for comments on earlier versions of the paper, as well as Assaf Shtauber and Tadios Tewolde for helpful research assistance. Detailed comments from two anonymous referees and the acting editor (Bernard Dumas) also greatly improved the paper. The views expressed in this paper are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Bank of Canada. 1Ever since the seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990) following the global October 1987 stock market crash, the international finance literature has studied how shocks are transmitted across borders.Words with negative connotations such as "volatility spillovers" (e.g., Engle, Ito and Lin (1990);Masulis, Hamao and Ng (1990)) and "contagion" have been coined to indicate shock transmission that cannot be explained by fundamentals or co-movements that are viewed as "excessive." Countless papers have been written proposing quantitative measures of contagion (see Karolyi (2003); Dungey et al. (2004), for surveys) or developing theories to explain it (e.g., Allen and Gale (2000)).The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 has arguably been the first truly major global crisis since the Great Depression of 1929 to 1932. While the crisis initially had its origin in the United States in a relatively small segment of the lending market, the sub-prime mortgage market, it rapidly spread across virtually all economies, both advanced and emerging, as well as across economic sectors. It also affected equity markets worldwide, with many countries experi...