Necessity as the Mother of Invention: Monetary Policy after the Crisis

Abstract

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Central banking in the twenty-first century

“…We then explore the implications of a different, Post Keynesian, understanding. While the logic of central banking is presented here as universal at one level, the particular historical, political, legal institutional and cultural context is critically important for its application (see Blinder et al, 2017).…”

“…Indeed, Blinder et al (2017) find widespread acknowledgement among central bankers of the need to add pursuit of financial stability to their mandate. Institutional changes in the pursuit of financial stability, such as the establishment of the international Financial Stability Board and the reorganisation of national central banks, reflect central banks' change in focus.…”

Financial Stability and the Fed: Evidence from Congressional Hearings

“…This paper's findings are related to current discussions on the interactions between monetary and financial stability. Central bankers now widely agree that macroprudential policy is an important addition to the macroeconomic toolkit (Blinder et al 2017). However, there is still an ongoing debate among academics and policymakers on the precise implications of the crisis for the interactions between monetary and financial stability (Smets, 2014;Adrian and Liang, 2017;Svensson, 2017).…”

Monetary Policy Stretched to the Limit: How Could Governments Support the European Central Bank?

“…As a result, central banks ventured ever-more deeply in fields that are considered to be the prerogative of fiscal policy, such as public debt operations, credit allocation and income and wealth distribution, going well beyond conventional monetary policy or a temporary role as lender of last resort (Blinder et al, 2017). This fiscalisation of monetary policy raised political concerns over central bank independence .…”