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Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon (2002, Study 1) demonstrated a causal link between subjective commitment to a relationship and how people responded to hypothetical betrayals of that relationship. Participants primed to think about their commitment to their partner (high commitment) reacted to the betrayals with reduced exit and neglect responses relative to those primed to think about their independence from their partner (low commitment). The priming manipulation did not affect constructive voice and loyalty responses. Although other studies have demonstrated a correlation between subjective commitment and responses to betrayal, this study provides the only experimental evidence that inducing changes to subjective commitment can causally affect forgiveness responses. This Registered Replication Report (RRR) meta-analytically combines the results of 16 new direct replications of the original study, all of which followed a standardized, vetted, and preregistered protocol. The results showed little effect of the priming manipulation on the forgiveness outcome measures, but it also did not observe an effect of priming on subjective commitment, so the manipulation did not work as it had in the original study. We discuss possible explanations for the discrepancy between the findings from this RRR and the original study.

Evidence from three studies reveals a critical difference in self-control as a function of political ideology. Specifically, greater endorsement of political conservatism (versus liberalism) was associated with greater attention regulation and task persistence. Moreover, this relationship is shown to stem from varying beliefs in freewill; specifically, the association between political ideology and selfcontrol is mediated by differences in the extent to which belief in freewill is endorsed, is independent of task performance or motivation, and is reversed when freewill is perceived to impede (rather than enhance) self-control. Collectively, these findings offer insight into the self-control consequences of political ideology by detailing conditions under which conservatives and liberals are better suited to engage in self-control and outlining the role of freewill beliefs in determining these conditions. freewill beliefs | self-control | political ideology | individual differences P olitical ideologies loosely represent a shared set of beliefs that define both a specific social order and the means to attain it (1). These ideologies are often categorized into two broad groups-those who endorse traditional values and the status quo (conservatives) and those who endorse egalitarian ideals and progressive change (liberals) (2). Although research demonstrates the various consequences of these distinct ideologies (3), of primary interest to the present research is the unexplored possibility for selfcontrol differences between conservatives and liberals. In particular, we hypothesize that conservatives will demonstrate greater selfcontrol than liberals.This proposition-although untested-is not without indirect support. Kemmelmeier et al. (4) demonstrate that conservative students earn higher grades in college than liberals (controlling for general intellect). The authors interpret this finding as a function of social dominance, arguing that doing well in these disciplines promotes the existing social hierarchy that conservatives seek to maintain. However, a complementary position is that conservatives more strongly embrace the belief that they are responsible for their actions (i.e., freewill beliefs) (5-8). For instance, it could be that conservatives believe they have greater control over their performance and thus expend greater selfcontrol in their academic pursuits.The possibility that conservatives and liberals differ in their freewill beliefs would be consistent with the attributional proclivities of conservatives and liberals. Specifically, conservatives tend to attribute causality to internal or dispositional factors (e.g., personal effort and control), whereas liberals tend to attribute causality to external factors (e.g., systemic or sociocultural forces) (9-13). Given that conservatives are more likely than liberals to make internal attributions for their actions, it follows that conservatives should also more strongly endorse the belief in freewill than should liberals. Indeed, believing outcomes are dete...

Three types of close relationships have received attention from theorists and researchers interested in self-monitoring: friendships, romantic relationships, and marriage. Our review of this literature was organized around three phases of relationships: initiation, maintenance, and dissolution. Across the three types of relationships, consistent differences between high self-monitors and low self-monitors emerged concerning the structure of their social relationships (segmented vs. integrated), the basis for choosing friends and romantic partners (activity-based vs. person-based), and the orientation taken to romantic and marital partners (uncommitted vs. committed). Across all three types of relationships, however, little is known about the processes and consequences involved in the dissolution of close relationships for high self-monitors and low self-monitors. Relatively little is also known about the processes used by high self-monitors and low self-monitors to maintain their friendships and marriages. In addition to addressing these deficiencies in the literature, theorists and researchers interested in self-monitoring and close relationships need to develop sophisticated, causal models that can account for (a) interaction exchanges in the relationships, (b) dyadic as well as individual levels of analysis, and (c) temporal and situational changes in the course of close relationships.

A new measure, the Junior Self-Monitoring scale, was developed and related to individual differences in children's tendencies to engage in social comparison when making decisions. Snyder's work on self-monitoring in adults provided the theoretical framework for a developmental extension of this construct. As predicted, children scoring high in self-monitoring were more likely to attend to the decisions of other children, and to do so for a longer period of time, than were low seif-momtoring children. The scale may be useful for exploring the origins and developmental processes leading to adult individual differences in self-monitoring. Results were discussed in terms of the need for research on the ontogeny of individual differences in patterns of social behavior.The self is a topic of investigation that sits at the boundary of social, personality, and developmental psychology. Each of these disciplines typically takes a distinctive approach to research on the self, and each of them usually focuses on different issues. One theoretical approach to the self that has received a great deal of attention from both social and personality researchers, however, involves the construct of "self-monitoring" (Snyder, 1974(Snyder, , 1979. According to Snyder (1979), individuals differ in the extent to which they monitor, through self-observation and self-control, their expressive behavior and self-presentation. These individual differences may be conceptualized in terms of strategic processes. The prototypical high self-monitoring individual (HSM) is concerned about the situational and interpersonal appropriateness of his or her social behavior and is particularly sensitive to the self-presentation of relevant others in social situations. The cues provided by these relevant others serve as guidelines for monitoring (i.e., regulating and controlling) the HSM's own verbal and nonverbal self-presentation. The strategic question for the HSM is "What does the situation want me to be and how can I be that person?" By contrast, the prototypical low self-monitoring individual

It was predicted that high need for cognition students would better comprehend course material which required a great deal of effortful thought than would low need for cognition students; no differences were expected for material which required relatively less effortful thought. Students completed a measure of the need for cognition and four objective tests in an undergraduate social psychology course. As indicated by independent student-raters, course material varied in the amount of effortful thought required for mastery. Results were consistent with our hypotheses. Analysis also showed that the differences in the need for cognition on comprehension were not mediated by differences in intolerance of ambiguity.

Ambiguities in the conceptions and measurement of locus of control were investigated in this study. Specifically, some psychometric properties of several widely used measures of perceived behavior-outcome contingency, interpersonal power, and social self-efficacy were assessed. To different degrees, the results indicated that all three measures of perceived behavior-outcome contingency lacked convergent and discriminant validity. Implications for interpreting past research, directions for future investigations, and limitations of the present study are discussed.