A self-validation perspective on the mere thought effect

Clarkson, Joshua J.; Tormala, Zakary L.; Leone, Christopher

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.003

Cited by 49 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…We find this highly unlikely for three reasons. First, mere thought polarizes attitudes on topics about which one is confident (Clarkson, Tormala, & Leone, ) and about which there is a clear positive or negative association (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, ); it seems unlikely to have comparable effects on widely contested social and behavioral choices such as those considered here. Second, Liu and Latane () found that interaction has an effect on attitudes over and above thought listing.…”

Section: Limitations and Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism

Thomas

McGarty

Louis

2013

Euro J Social Psych

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Although psychology has recently witnessed a burgeoning interest in the predictors of social and political action generally, little research has considered the psychological mechanisms by which people come to choose extreme or radical forms of action. How and why do groups come to favor radical or extreme solutions (radicalization) over conventional political pathways (politicization)? Theory in both political science and psychology suggests that social interaction plays an important role, but this has never been demonstrated experimentally. Results (N = 114) show that social interaction can lead to both politicized and radicalized solutions but that radicalization rests on the perception that extreme action is legitimate. The findings provide the first experimental analog of the group‐based dynamics that underpin political engagement and political extremism. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Limitations and Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism

Thomas

McGarty

Louis

2013

Euro J Social Psych

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“…For example, one may perceive one's arguments to be strong or weak (Briñol et al, 2012), perceive oneself to have expended high or low effort in generating arguments (Briñol et al, 2012), or perceive oneself to be a knowledgeable or an unknowledgeable source on the topic (Ehret, Van Boven, & Sherman, 2018;Rios, Goldberg, & Totton, 2018). Meta-cognitive confidence is important because it has been shown to be a key driver of polarization not only in the context of self-persuasion more generally (see Clarkson, Tormala, & Leone, 2011;Clarkson, Valente, Leone, & Tormala, 2013), but more specifically during self-persuasion occurring as a result of pro-attitudinal advocacy. Specifically, increasing meta-cognitive confidence as indexed by perceived argument quality and effort, has been shown to lead to greater polarization following pro-attitudinal advocacy (Briñol et al, 2012).…”

Section: Meta-cognitive Confidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why moral advocacy leads to polarization and proselytization: The role of self-persuasion

Abeywickrama

Rhee

Crone

et al. 2020

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

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This research is the first to examine the effects of moral versus practical pro-attitudinal advocacy in the context of self-persuasion. We validate a novel advocacy paradigm aimed at uncovering why moral advocacy leads to polarization and proselytization. We investigate four distinct possibilities: (1) expression of moral foundational values (harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity), (2) reliance on moral systems (deontology and consequentialism), (3) expression of moral outrage, (4) increased confidence in one’s advocacy attempt. In Study 1 (N = 255) we find differences between moral and practical advocacy on the five moral foundations, deontology, and moral outrage. In Study 2 (N = 218) we replicate these differences, but find that only the expression of moral foundations is consequential in predicting attitude polarization. In Study 3 (N = 115) we replicate the effect of moral foundations on proselytization. Our findings suggest that practical compared to moral advocacy may attenuate polarization and proselytization. This carries implications for how advocacy can be re-framed in ways which minimize social conflict.

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“…가용성 편향이란 의사결정이나 문제를 해결할 때 가장 많이 또는 빠르게 생각나는 것을 토대로 의사결정을 해버리는 습관을 말한 다 (Schwarz et al, 1991;Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Tversky & Kahneman(1973) (Clarkson et al, 2011;Tesser, 1978) (Haslam et al, 2000). Gelman의 유아기의 사고 연구를 통하여 본질 주의의 인지심리학적 원리를 확인하였다 (Gelman, 2004).…”

Section: 인지편향은 생득적으로 형성되어 있는 인간의 사고 습관이며 교정unclassified

Exploring Cognitive Biases Limiting Rational Problem Solving and Debiasing Methods Using Science Education

하민수¹

2016

Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education

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This study aims to explore cognitive biases relating the core competences of science and instructional strategy in reducing the level of cognitive biases. The literature review method was used to explore cognitive biases and science education experts discussed the relevance of cognitive biases to science education. Twenty nine cognitive biases were categorized into five groups (limiting rational causal inference, limiting diverse information search, limiting self-regulated learning, limiting self-directed decision making, and category-limited thinking). The cognitive biases in limiting rational causal inference group are teleological thinking, availability heuristic, illusory correlation, and clustering illusion. The cognitive biases in limiting diverse information search group are selective perception, experimenter bias, confirmation bias, mere thought effect, attentional bias, belief bias, pragmatic fallacy, functional fixedness, and framing effect. The cognitive biases in limiting self-regulated learning group are overconfidence bias, better-than-average bias, planning fallacy, fundamental attribution error, Dunning-Kruger effect, hindsight bias, and blind-spot bias. The cognitive biases in limiting self-directed decision-making group are acquiescence effect, bandwagon effect, group-think, appeal to authority bias, and information bias. Lastly, the cognitive biases in category-limited thinking group are psychological essentialism, stereotyping, anthropomorphism, and outgroup homogeneity bias. The instructional strategy to reduce the level of cognitive biases is disused based on the psychological characters of cognitive biases reviewed in this study and related science education methods.

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A self-validation perspective on the mere thought effect

Cited by 49 publications

References 17 publications

Social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism

Social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism

Why moral advocacy leads to polarization and proselytization: The role of self-persuasion

Exploring Cognitive Biases Limiting Rational Problem Solving and Debiasing Methods Using Science Education

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