In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005International environmental agreements, Stock externalities, Differential games, Open-loop Nash equilibrium,
We refer to Flaaten's (JEEM 1991, pp. 163-80) study on competing species. In Theorem 5 (Theorem 6), Flaaten claims that a higher price (harvesting costs) of one species yields a lower (greater) own stock-size and a greater (lower) stock-size of the competing species in the steady state. It is shown that both claims are wrong.
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