Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant

Rubio, Santiago J.; Casino, Begoña

doi:10.2139/ssrn.461500

Cited by 14 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…10 In this case, the model generates stable coalitions of two members; and we perform a sensitivity analysis, which reveals that the size of a stable coalition may not be greater than two. This is consistent with the result in Rubio and Casino (2005) who analyze an IEA under fixed membership using a differential game (with open-loop emission strategies). They find numerically in their model, without uncertainty, that an IEA can sustain only a coalition of size not greater than two.…”

Section: Stable Agreementssupporting

confidence: 90%

“…We assume for simplicity that, in each period, one unit of production in any of the countries generates one unit of pollution. Country i's benefit function is given by U (e it ), t = 1, 2, where U is an increasing and concave utility function, and e it is i's emission level at date t. Following Ulph (2004) and Rubio and Ulph (2002), we assume that total emissions accumulate according to the law of motion:…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ulph (2004) studies how the prospect of getting better information about the future can affect the ability of countries to ratify an IEA. To analyze this issue, he incorporates uncertainty about damages in each of the two periods in the model of Rubio and Ulph (2002). He then compares the resulting outcome to that of the model where there is no uncertainty in period 2 in order to measure the effect of learning (which results in larger stable IEAs).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rubio and Ulph (2002),Ulph (2004), and Nkuiya (2012) use the dynamic and/or the fixed membership framework to address different questions. 3 For a detailed discussion, seeFinus (2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

Nkuiya

Marrouch

Bahel

2015

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the "puzzle of small coalitions" found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case.

show abstract

Section: Stable Agreementssupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rubio and Ulph (2002),Ulph (2004), and Nkuiya (2012) use the dynamic and/or the fixed membership framework to address different questions. 3 For a detailed discussion, seeFinus (2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

Nkuiya

Marrouch

Bahel

2015

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…5 Rubio and Casino (2005) and Rubio and Ulph (2007) also study IEAs within a dynamic context. They do not study the effect of cleaner technologies or use farsighted stability criteria.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Benchekroun

Chaudhuri

2015

Journal of Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper shows that if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies, as embodied by a reduction in the emission per output ratio, may either improve or jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. A small change in the emission per output ratio can result in a discrete jump in the stable size of a coalition and global welfare evaluated under the stable coalition size. In the case of three countries, the grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. In the case of more than three countries, implementing cleaner technologies may result in a discrete jump, either upward or downward, of the largest stable coalition size and welfare. We examine both, the case of a flow and that of a stock pollutant. In the latter case, we show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that a grand coalition of three countries is destabilized. Measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants are shown to have similar effects on the size of stable coalitions to reductions in the emission per output ratio.

show abstract

New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

Eyckmans

Finus

2006

Environ Econ Policy Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal&external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.

show abstract

Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant

Cited by 14 publications

References 34 publications

International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

International Environmental Agreements under Endogenous Uncertainty

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About