New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

Abstract

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal&external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.

Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges

“…For instance, the CLIMNEG World Simulation model (CWS model) is a modification of the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and stable coalitions are determined with algorithms programmed with the 11 With coalitional abatement I mean the aggregate abatement level of the coalition. software package GAMS (e.g., Eyckmans and Finus (2006a) and Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003)). …”

“…Note that in the STACO model overall magnitudes about accumulated emissions are calibrated such that they are in line with those of RICE. 15 See Eyckmans and Finus (2006a where the issues (a) single versus multiple coalitions, (b) open versus exclusive membership, and (c) various transfer schemes, which I discuss subsequently, are also considered. Only the issue efficient abatement versus bargaining has not been considered with the CWS model.…”

The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

“…1 Many authors have contributed to this approach, such as Siniscalco (1991, 1993), Carraro et al (2006), Barrett (1994Barrett ( , 1997, Bloch (1995Bloch ( , 1996Bloch ( , 1997, Yi (1997), Finus (2003b), Finus and Rundshagen (2003b, c), Eyckmans and Finus (2006), and Caparrós et al (2004). However, with the exception of Finus and Rundshagen (2003b), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Carraro et al (2006), in the non-cooperative approach, there are no utility transfers within or across coalitions.…”

How social preferences influence the stability of a climate coalition

“…Since Barrett (1994), a large number of studies (such as Bahn et al (2009), Barrett (2001), Bratberg, Tjøtta, and Ø ines (2005), and Eyckmans and Finus (2006)) have explored the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate change. Most theoretical predictions on IEAs predicted a rather low number of signatories to a stable self-enforcing coalition (Grüning and Peters 2010).…”