A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control

Rubio, Santiago J.; Casino, Begoña

doi:10.1016/s0928-7655(02)00002-7

Cited by 77 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Dockner and Long (1993) characterized the non-linear feedback Nash equilibria for this problem and showed that the optimal management steady state can be approximated by a feedback Nash equilibrium steady state, for small enough discount rates. Rubio and Casino (2002) shown in this paper that the value of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is generally worse than the value of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore a fortiori worse than the value under optimal management.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 70%

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Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control

Kossioris

Plexousakis

Xepapadeas

et al. 2008

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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Dynamic problems of pollution and resource management with stock externalities often require a di¤erential games framework of analysis. In addition they are represented realistically by non linear transition equations. However, feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) 1 solutions, which are the desired ones in this case, are di¢ cult to obtain in problems with non linear-quadratic structure. We develop a method to obtain numerically non linear FBNE for a class of such problems, with a speci…c example for shallow lake pollution control.We compare FBNE solutions, by considering the entire equilibrium trajectories, with optimal management and open loop solutions and we show that the value of the best FBNE is in general worse than the open loop and optimal management solutions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…This situation is depicted in Fig. 1 in Dockner and Long (1993), as well as in Rubio and Casino (2002).…”

Section: Feedback Nash Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 76%

Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control

Kossioris

Plexousakis

Xepapadeas

et al. 2008

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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“…These papers and also a number of other applications in environmental and resource economics (see e.g. Reference [4] on the tragedy of the commons and its follow up in Reference [5], and related to this tragedy the problem of fish war, e.g. in Reference [6] based on Reference [7], Wirl [8] on carbon rent contests and the related treatises in References [9][10][11], and finally References [12,13] are more recent examples) apply deterministic differential games; Reference [14] is a recent and comprehensive account of this approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International greenhouse gas emissions when global warming is a stochastic process

Wirl

2004

Appl Stoch Models Bus & Ind

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SUMMARYThis paper integrates two different but crucial aspects of global warming: free riding and uncertainty. Although certainty equivalence does not hold, an analytical solution is obtained if 'clean up' (e.g. reforestation) is possible. Assuming realistically irreversible emissions, numerical methods are necessary to obtain the value function and the implied strategies, which are shown to be unique (for the calibrated parameters). Although uncertainty stresses the importance of conservation, the incentives to free ride are almost the same. Beyond the particular application, the paper shows how to analyze stochastic, dynamic games.

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“…Second, when designing and assessing the (2013). 4 See also the fish war difference game of Levhari and Mirmann (1980), the transboundary pollution games in Dockner and Long (1993) and Rubio and Casino (2002), and the general productive asset games of Benhabib and Radner (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1993), Dockner and Sorger (1996). 5 In economics experiments, there have been studies that show that Markovian strategies characterize behaviour in dynamic games with states of the game evolving over time (Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey 2012a, Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey 2012band Vespa 2012.…”

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confidence: 99%