An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time

Benchekroun, Hassan; Engle‐Warnick, Jim; Tasneem, Dina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2403899

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…where S 0 is the initial stock level, F(S) is the natural replenishment function (representing the recovery of the resource), F(S) is the stock limit (a stock-based threshold for growth rate), and S is the maximum carrying capacity of the habitat. e stock naturally grows at a rate of δ until reaching the stock limit F(S), after which the growth continues at a lower or even negative rate [6].…”

Section: Natural Replenishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, small-scale wood smuggling by residents can also harm forests to the extent that the damage cannot be reversed by natural growth or even tree planting. It has been estimated despite the e orts of Mazandaran's Natural Resources and Watershed Management Organization, only 30% of wood smuggling in this area is discovered, a de ciency that has been attributed due to the shortage of monitoring and enforcement personnel [3,6]. Furthermore, some local residents are not willing to leave the forest and are adamant about expanding rural areas into forests [7,8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Extensive research has been conducted on this modeling. In the work by Benchekroun et al [6], an experimental study was conducted on linear and nonlinear Markov perfect equilibria of a game of symmetric competition for a common-property renewable resource. In the study of Sorger [7], this problem was modeled with the amenity value and extraction costs included in calculations, and the cooperative equilibrium and the Markov perfect equilibrium for the noncooperative game were obtained with the assumption of symmetry in resource exploitation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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[Retracted] Balance Harvest from the Forest as a Renewable Resource Using Game Theory

Dwijendra

Sivaraman

Kaliyaperumal

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Forests are among the most important renewable natural resources. While having a great range of benefits, the crucial advantage of forests is the production of oxygen and the absorption of pollutants. Thus, the current article attempts to examine forest exploitation as a source of wood to prevent forest overexploitation. Three smugglers, residents, and timber companies exploit this resource. There is a competition for the perception of this common source between these factors. In this article, these interactions are considered a game in order to obtain the most probable solution in the real competition between these factors by examining this game. This answer is the balance of the game. In order to use this answer, the behavior of the players can be predicted and used in management planning. Since the amount of withdrawals of operating companies depends on the current inventory (t), the player’s behavior is determined by the system’s current state and then Markov equilibrium was obtained for them.

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Section: Natural Replenishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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[Retracted] Balance Harvest from the Forest as a Renewable Resource Using Game Theory

Dwijendra

Sivaraman

Kaliyaperumal

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…All other components-the set of states Θ, the set of actions A, the discount parameter δ and the number of players-will be common. 2 For other experimental papers that use dynamic games, see Saijo, Sherstyuk, Tarui, and Ravago (2016), Benchekroun, Engle-Warnick, and Tasneem (2014), and Kloosterman (2019). 3 In a precursor paper to this one, Vespa and Wilson (2016), we expand on the presence of historydependent and history-independent play in two-state dynamic games.…”

Section: Treatmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… For other experimental papers that use dynamic games, see Saijo, Sherstyuk, Tarui, and Ravago (), Benchekroun, Engle‐Warnick, and Tasneem (), and Kloosterman (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimenting with the transition rule in dynamic games

Vespa

Wilson²

2019

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In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history‐dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects respond to the transition rule and internalize its effects on continuation values. Our main comparison is between an endogenous transition where future states directly depend on current choices, and exogenous transitions where the future environment is random and independent of actions. Our evidence shows that subjects readily internalize the effect of the dynamic game transition rule on their incentives, in line with history‐dependent theoretical predictions.

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An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time

Cited by 2 publications

References 53 publications

[Retracted] Balance Harvest from the Forest as a Renewable Resource Using Game Theory

[Retracted] Balance Harvest from the Forest as a Renewable Resource Using Game Theory

Experimenting with the transition rule in dynamic games

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