Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater

Rubio, Santiago J.; Casino, Begoña

doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9984-9_6

Cited by 31 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…10. Following Tsutsui and Mino (1990) in the field of industrial economics or Wirl (1994) in the field of environmental economics, Rubio and Casino (2003) examined whether there exist feedback equilibria which approach the cooperative solution more than path strategies. Their findings show that strategic behavior (i.e.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Koundouri

2004

Journal of Economic Surveys

177

125

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world, while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource. In this article, we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater. Our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity. We present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources, indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource, and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality-graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels. In particular, we critically review economic models of groundwater use, examine the potential for groundwater management, discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models, and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use (allocation) of this resource. Finally, we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation, and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Koundouri

2004

Journal of Economic Surveys

177

125

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These externalities have been studied by a.o. Negri (1989), Provencher and Burt (1993), and Rubio and Casino (2003) and a general result is that the level of these externalities is not substantial compared to optimal (i.e. cooperative) management, although this result cannot explain the mixed empirical evidence on success and failure of transboundary aquifer management.…”

Section: From Water Bodies To Riversmentioning

confidence: 92%

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

Ansink

Houba

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…4 See, among others, Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Koundouri (2004), Rubio and Casino (2003). 5 For simplification, we do not take into account the local percolation and discharge.…”

Section: Farmers' Net Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rainwater Harvesting and Groundwater Conservation: When Endogenous Heterogeneity Matters

Soubeyran

Tidball

Tomini

et al. 2014

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications. JEL ClassificationWe acknowledge financial support from the ANR project "RISECO", ANR-08-JCJC-0074-01. R. Soubeyran (B) · M. Tidball

show abstract

Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater

Cited by 31 publications

References 16 publications

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

Rainwater Harvesting and Groundwater Conservation: When Endogenous Heterogeneity Matters

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About