The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Abbs, Luke; Clayton, Govinda; Thomson, Andrew

doi:10.1177/0022002719883684

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 62 publications

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“…Communal ties vary by context and can be based on ethnic, religious, family, or partisan identity (Makara, 2013;Abbs, Clayton and Thomson, 2020). A key aspect is a shared identity with the regime.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Structured to Kill? Characteristics of State Security Forces and Violent Repression of Protest in Autocracies

Rød¹

2023

Preprint

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What explains patterns of violent protest repression in autocracies? According to conventional wisdom, rulers respond with repression during periods of dissent. However, there is considerable variation in repression when autocrats face popular protest. I contribute to our understanding of coercive responses to dissent by studying how characteristics of state security forces in autocracies shape protest repression. I argue that the existence and number of regime-affiliated state security forces impact violence against protesters. Three characteristics make affiliated security forces more prone to repress protesters: 1) they have a vested interest in maintaining the political status quo; 2) they tend to be socially exclusive and; 3) they often recruit individuals that enjoy violence. Further, multiple affiliated security forces lead to competition over state resources, increasing the willingness to use violence during protests. Empirical results from a large-N study of 41 autocratic countries from 2003 to 2010 show that state security forces affiliated with the autocratic regime are more likely to use lethal protest repression.

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Structured to Kill? Characteristics of State Security Forces and Violent Repression of Protest in Autocracies

Rød¹

2023

Preprint

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Governance Interrupted: Rebel Governance and Pro-Government Militias

Joo

Sosa

2023

Journal of Global Security Studies

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Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs’ relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.

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Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War: Explaining the Fates of Victorious Militias

Bolte

Joo

Mukherjee

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militia, a process of mutual uncertainty in the post-war period will incentivize governments to disintegrate the group. However, governments will be most likely to integrate their militias when the military has sufficient coercive capabilities but few organizational hindrances to re-organizing. Using new data on the post-war fates of victorious militias across all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2014, we find robust support for these claims. The results suggest that a government’s optimal militia management strategy is shaped by both social and organizational constraints during the post-war period.

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The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Cited by 4 publications

References 62 publications

Structured to Kill? Characteristics of State Security Forces and Violent Repression of Protest in Autocracies

Structured to Kill? Characteristics of State Security Forces and Violent Repression of Protest in Autocracies

Governance Interrupted: Rebel Governance and Pro-Government Militias

Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War: Explaining the Fates of Victorious Militias

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