The reported role of social media in recent popular uprisings against Arab autocrats has fueled the notion of 'liberation technology', namely that information and communication technology (ICT) facilitates organization of antigovernment movements in autocracies. Less optimistic observers, on the other hand, contend that ICT is a tool of repression in the hands of autocrats, imposing further restrictions on political and social liberties. We investigate whether the liberation-or the repression-technology perspective can better explain empirically observed patterns.To this end, we analyze two outcomes. First, we look at which autocracies are more likely to adopt and expand the Internet. In line with the repression technology expectation, we find that regimes aiming to prevent any independent public sphere are more likely to introduce the Internet. Second, we study the effects of the Internet on changes towards democracy. This analysis reveals no effect of the Internet on political institutions. These findings provide moderate support for the 'repression technology' perspective, and suggest that the Internet has not -at least in its first two decades of existence -contributed to a global shift towards democracy.

This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.

In the aftermath of recent popular uprisings in dictatorships, many observers argued that information and communication technologies, notably the Internet, played a key role in the mobilization of political protest. This book unpacks when and under which circumstances Internet technology can benefit opposition activists aiming to mobilize protests, and when the technology plays into the hands of autocratic governments. Since autocratic governments enjoy a high degree of control over the introduction and expansion of Internet technology and over digital communication ows, the book argues that it should help them keep levels of protest low in the long-term. However, once protest has started, short-term government intervention becomes more difficult, which is why Internet technology can catalyze ongoing episodes of unrest. The book presents detailed empirical analyses of the relationship between the use of Internet technology and protest in autocracies. By leveraging new sub-national data on political protest and Internet penetration, these analysis cover more than sixty autocratic countries at the level of cities. The results show that higher levels of Internet penetration in cities reduce the overall occurrence of protest in dictatorships, but once protest has started, the Internet contributes to the continuation of protest in the same city as well as its diffusion to other locations. By examining the use of the Internet by governments in relation to other means of autocratic repression, the book also demonstrates the technological modernization of autocratic politics, where digital repression via the Internet partly substitutes traditional forms of political control.

Numerous studies-operating with diverse model specifications, samples and empirical measures-suggest different economic, social, cultural, demographic, institutional and international determinants of democracy. We distinguish between democratization and democratic survival and test the sensitivities of 67 proposed determinants by varying the control variable set, democracy measure, and sample time period. Furthermore, we go beyond existing sensitivity analyses and unpack the aggregate results by analyzing how theoretically motivated control variables affect sensitivity for two prominent determinants in the democracy literature: income and Islam. Overall, our results reveal a far larger number of robust determinants of democratization than of democratic survival. For democratic survival, the only robust factors are income and a law-abiding bureaucracy. In addition, our results highlight uncertainty surrounding the relationship between income and democratization, but show that broader development processes enhance the chances of democratization. Moreover, chances of democratization are lower in countries with large Muslim populations, but that relationship is sensitive to controlling for natural resources, education and neighborhood characteristics. Other results of the sensitivity analysis show that political protests, a democratic neighborhood, and the global proportion of democracies positively influence democratization, while natural resources, majoritarian systems, and long-tenured leaders make countries less likely to democratize.