Despite the recent emergence of subnational civil conflict data, subnational conflict theory remains underdeveloped. For example, why are some locations more conflict prone than others?In addition, refugee studies continue to aggregate refugee flows, ignoring the differences between refugee movements and refugee camp locations. This study seeks to fill these gaps while incorporating theory on transnational rebels. This paper argues that refugee camps provide lootable goods and potential recruits, which facilitates a rebel group's capacity to wage war effectively. Rebel groups can access refugee camps located outside of refugee origin states and take advantage of any available material and human resources. Quantitative analyses using UCDP conflict data exhibit a negative relationship between conflict and the distance from a given grid cell centroid and the nearest refugee camp, diamonds, and gemstones. These findings indicate a need to devote greater attention to refugee camps in order to ameliorate the negative externalities of civil war.
The underlying risk factors associated with the duration and termination of biological, sociological, economic, or political processes often exhibit spatial clustering. However, existing nonspatial survival models, including those that account for “immune” and “at-risk” subpopulations, assume that these baseline risks are spatially independent, leading to inaccurate inferences in split-population survival settings. In this paper, we develop a Bayesian spatial split-population survival model that addresses these methodological challenges by accounting for spatial autocorrelation among units in terms of their probability of becoming immune and their survival rates. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that, unlike nonspatial models, this spatial model provides accurate parameter estimates in the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Applying our spatial model to data from published studies on authoritarian reversals and civil war recurrence reveals that accounting for spatial autocorrelation in split-population models leads to new empirical insights, reflecting the need to theoretically and statistically account for space and non-failure inflation in applied research.
Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militia, a process of mutual uncertainty in the post-war period will incentivize governments to disintegrate the group. However, governments will be most likely to integrate their militias when the military has sufficient coercive capabilities but few organizational hindrances to re-organizing. Using new data on the post-war fates of victorious militias across all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2014, we find robust support for these claims. The results suggest that a government’s optimal militia management strategy is shaped by both social and organizational constraints during the post-war period.
In most contemporary civil wars, governments collude with non-state militias as part of their counterinsurgent strategy. However, governments also restrict the capabilities of their militia allies despite the adverse consequences this may have on their overall counterinsurgent capabilities. Why do governments contain their militia allies while also fighting a rebellion? I argue that variation in militia containment during a civil war is the outcome of a bargaining process over future bargaining power between security or profit-seeking militias and states with time-inconsistent preferences. Strong states and states facing weak rebellions cannot credibly commit to not suppressing their militias, and militias with sufficient capabilities to act independently cannot credibly commit to not betraying the state. States with limited political reach and those facing strong rebellions, however, must retain militia support, which opens a “window of opportunity” for militias to augment their independent capabilities and future bargaining power. Using new data on pro-government militia containment and case illustrations of the Janjaweed in Sudan and Civil Defense Patrols in Guatemala, I find evidence consistent with these claims. Future work must continue to incorporate the agency of militias when studying armed politics, since these bargaining interactions constitute a fundamental yet undertheorized characteristic of war-torn states.
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