Structured to Kill? Characteristics of State Security Forces and Violent Repression of Protest in Autocracies

Abstract

What explains patterns of violent protest repression in autocracies? According to conventional wisdom, rulers respond with repression during periods of dissent. However, there is considerable variation in repression when autocrats face popular protest. I contribute to our understanding of coercive responses to dissent by studying how characteristics of state security forces in autocracies shape protest repression. I argue that the existence and number of regime-affiliated state security forces impact violence against protesters. Three characteristics make affiliated security forces more prone to repress protesters: 1) they have a vested interest in maintaining the political status quo; 2) they tend to be socially exclusive and; 3) they often recruit individuals that enjoy violence. Further, multiple affiliated security forces lead to competition over state resources, increasing the willingness to use violence during protests. Empirical results from a large-N study of 41 autocratic countries from 2003 to 2010 show that state security forces affiliated with the autocratic regime are more likely to use lethal protest repression.