The Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition

Abstract

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage this trade‐off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate‐level data from Vietnam, we demonstrate that single‐party regimes, in particular, forsake information on overall regime support and strength of opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.

The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

“…14.8% missed all three questions (UNDP-PAPI 2011). Rather than providing vertical accountability (O'Donnell 1994), low-quality elections and limited voter information allow DPCs to be captured by local elites who can nominate favored candidates for positions, manipulate candidate vetting in their favor, and use their informational advantage to make sure their choices are elected (Malesky and Schuler 2011). Because these same local elites are also represented on the DPCOM, the DPC has a very hard time fulfilling its oversight role of the local executive (Van Arkadie et al 2010, 155; Vu 2012, 19).…”

The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons from Expert Evaluations

“…Not unlike Turkmenistan, genuine competition is thus not an element of elections in Viet Nam. Rather, the polls serve as a yardstick for the party to gauge the popularity of local notables and the performance of local officials (Malesky & Schuler, 2011). Malaysia, on the other hand, sees fierce electoral competition.…”

“… An election expert is defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who has demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). For a discussion of the merits of using expert assessments over other types of measurement, an in‐depth description of the methodology, and the validity of the instrument, see Martínez i Coma and van Ham () and Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma (). …”

Legislative Power and Women's Representation

“…Even though the representativeness of a legislature can be functionally irrelevant in authoritarian states, elections in them are often held and can provide the regime useful information (Malesky and Schuler 2011), the elected assemblies occasionally exert independent power (Desposato 2001), and women's representation in them is frequently a priority (Dahlerup 2006;Krook 2009). Even though the representativeness of a legislature can be functionally irrelevant in authoritarian states, elections in them are often held and can provide the regime useful information (Malesky and Schuler 2011), the elected assemblies occasionally exert independent power (Desposato 2001), and women's representation in them is frequently a priority (Dahlerup 2006;Krook 2009).…”