R ecent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.
This paper tests whether firm growth reduces corruption, using data from over 10,000 Vietnamese firms. We employ instrumental variables based on growth in a firm's industry in other provinces within Vietnam and in China. We find that firm growth reduces bribes as a share of revenues. We propose a mechanism for this effect whereby government officials' decisions about bribes are modulated by inter-jurisdictional competition. This
This paper tests the hypothesis that increasing stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) can lead to de facto decentralization in the form of autonomous reform experiments by subnational leaders. Because these reform experiments may attract FDI in subsequent years, there is a possibility of endogeneity. As a result, the methodology is a simultaneous equation model of 61 Vietnamese provinces between 1990 and 2000. Stocks of FDI as a percentage of GDP are regressed on a measure of autonomy derived from a content analysis of Vietnamese stateowned newspapers. Every time a province is cited in the papers for violating central laws on economic policy by engaging in reform experimentation, it is coded as a case of autonomy. The central question of the analysis is: how much FDI is needed for a province to believe it has the bargaining power to challenge central authority for the first time in a given year? Using this approach, I find strong evidence for the influence of FDI on local autonomous economic reform experiments.
Two theories predominate in discussions of why China and Vietnam have, over the past three decades, achieved such rapid economic growth. The first argues that their startling performance can be explained by economic factors associated with late industrialization. The second proposes that China and Vietnam represent novel models of political economic organization that need to be better studied and understood. In this essay we review the voluminous literature on the political economy of China and Vietnam, evaluating the critical debates over the economic benefits of decentralization, experimentation, and state-led development. Although the debate remains unsettled, analysis suggests that growth in the two countries was most robust during periods of state withdrawal from the economy and that current economic difficulties in both countries are now arising from the scale and character of the state's role in both economies.
A n influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters' responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitute for the incentives created by voters. Such interventions, however, are at odds with an emerging literature that argues that authoritarian parliaments primarily serve the role of co-optation and limited power sharing, where complaints can be raised in a manner that does not threaten regime stability. We argue that under these conditions, transparency may have perverse effects, and we test this theory with a randomized experiment on delegate behavior in query sessions in Vietnam, a single-party authoritarian regime. We find no evidence of a direct effect of the transparency treatment on delegate performance; however, further analysis reveals that delegates subjected to high treatment intensity demonstrate robust evidence of curtailed participation and damaged reelection prospects. These results make us cautious about the export of transparency without electoral sanctioning.
for helpful comments. The PCI survey data used in this paper was funded by USAID, and was collected by Development Alternatives Incorporated with the cooperation of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of these organizations or the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19483.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
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