The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam

Malesky, Edmund J.; Cuong, Nguyen Viet; Tran, Anh

doi:10.1017/s0003055413000580

Cited by 120 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 50 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In reality, the real power lies in the hands of the leaders of the Communist Party Organ of the commune, who often hold key positions in the Council, the Committee, and the Commune's Police Station (Malesky et al, 2013). There is very little separation between these bodies, and the operation of the Party Organ is usually kept out of the public scrutiny.…”

Section: Local Governance In the Communes Of Vietnam IXmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?

Nguyen

2016

The Journal of Development Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption at the local government.We examine whether a natural disaster affects official households more favorably than nonofficial households. We find that natural disasters decrease nonofficial household expenditures significantly, however have negligible effect on official household expenditures.Meanwhile, both kinds of households experience similar reduction in incomes, and have much the same disaster coping strategies. Together, the results imply that local officials may receive unobserved monetary compensation -we define as corruption -in the aftermath of natural disasters. JEL: Q3, H3, C2

show abstract

Section: Local Governance In the Communes Of Vietnam IXmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?

Nguyen

2016

The Journal of Development Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Data on expropriated land from Landesa China Survey 2011. 12 Bardhan 2002;Campos and Heilman 2005;acemoglu, reed, and robinson 2014;Malesky, nguyen, and tran 2014. so they are a crucial part of the calculus of land deals. using data from a national survey, i find that when lineage elites join village political institutions, it increases the likelihood of a land expropriation by 14 to 20 percent.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite Capture

Mattingly¹

2016

World Pol.

133

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Political decentralization is often argued to strengthen political accountability by bringing government closer to the people. Social and civic institutions at the local level, such as lineage associations, temples, churches, or social clubs, can make it easier for citizens to monitor officials and hold them accountable. This article argues that strong social institutions also empower local elites who may use their informal influence to control their group and capture rents. Drawing on evidence from case studies of Chinese villages, the article shows that lineage group leaders who become village officials use their combination of social and political authority to confiscate villagers’ land. Evidence from a survey experiment suggests that endorsement of a land confiscation plan by lineage elites elicits greater compliance with property seizures. A national survey indicates that when a lineage leader becomes a village cadre, it is associated with a 14 to 20 percent increase in the likelihood of a land expropriation. The findings demonstrate how informal institutions and local civil society can be tools of top-down political control.

show abstract

“…Among the skeptics, Davoodi and Zou (1998) believe that devolving power to sub-national governments slows economic growth in developing countries, Parry (1997) is skeptical that decentralization in Chile has improved educational outcomes, and, more recently, Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran (2014) find that public service provision mostly improved after the abolition of district-level representative councils in Vietnam.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%