Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization: How Elections and Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods

Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto Ponce; Hankla, Charles R.; Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge; Heredia-Ortiz, Eunice

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2188613

Cited by 9 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…This article provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for the empirical work presented in Ponce-Rodríguez et al (2018). Moreover, while the models developed here build on those in our book (Hankla et al 2019), we introduce several significant extensions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the extensive variation in party organization that exists in the real world, these findings are of great empirical significance. Of the 157 countries that we have coded for our empirical work (see Hankla et al 2019; Ponce-Rodríguez et al 2018), 106 were characterized by some degree of democratic decentralization. Of these 106, sixty-seven countries have had integrated parties for at least some years and forty-nine have consistently had non-integrated parties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 5. See Hankla et al (2019) for a previous analysis of systems using proportional representation, and Ponce-Rodríguez et al (2018) for an empirical test of our arguments. Note also that the model assumes that parties possess meaningful organizational structures and are not purely dominated by personalist ‘bosses’.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 1. Note that, in Ponce-Rodríguez et al (2018), we use the term ‘party (de)centralization’ for a similar concept. As we explain later in this paper, we adopt the term ‘party (non)integration’ here because it corresponds more closely to our intended meaning and is consistent with the use of the term in our recent book, Hankla et al (2019). …”

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confidence: 99%

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The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem

Rodríguez

Hankla

Martínez-Vázquez

et al. 2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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We explore how party structures can condition the benefits of decentralization in modern democracies. In particular, we study the interaction of two political institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integration (whether power over local party leaders flows upwards through party institutions, which we model using control over candidate selection). We incorporate these institutions into our strong decentralization theorem, which expands on Oates (1972) to examine when the decentralized provision of public services will dominate centralized provision even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Our findings suggest that, when externalities are present, democratic decentralization will be beneficial only when parties are integrated. In countries with non-integrated parties, we find that the participation rules of primaries have implications for the expected gains from democratic decentralization. Under blanket primaries, Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds but our strong decentralization theorem does not. By contrast, when primaries are closed, not even Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem

Rodríguez

Hankla

Martínez-Vázquez

et al. 2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…However, a consequence of this de-centralized approach to social distancing is that it may be less effective in controlling the spread of the virus through a country's population. Health outcomes enacted at the state or local level, such as control of the COVID-19 disease outbreak through social distancing, are local public goods with strong inter-jurisdictional spillovers (GMF Experts 2020; Pineda and Radics 2020;Ponce-Rodríguez et al 2018). An individual infected in a state or province with weak social distancing rules could transmit the disease when traveling to another state or province, even if the latter jurisdiction has a stronger social distancing policy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

National and Sub-National Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19

Iverson

Barbier

2021

Economies

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We examine the effectiveness of sub-national actions to control a novel disease, such as COVID-19, in the absence of national policy. Evidence shows that countries where sub-national governments have undertaken unilateral social distancing measures to combat the pandemic with little or no coordination have performed less well in controlling the spread of the disease. We explore analytically whether agreement on a common social distancing policy among sub-national governments, i.e., states or provinces, can lead to a better outcome than if each state or province pursues its own social distancing policy in isolation. A key feature of our model is that it accounts for the inter-jurisdictional spillover effects of each sub-national jurisdiction’s policy choice with respect to social distancing. Our results show that, in the absence of a national mandatory agreement, a sub-national agreement with sufficient coordination of social distancing policy among states yields a more effective and efficient control of a pandemic compared to states choosing policy unilaterally. These findings strongly support calls for greater cooperation among and assistance for sub-national governments to improve the effectiveness of their social distancing efforts in controlling the pandemic.

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Better service delivery, more satisfied citizens? The mediating effects of local government management capacity in South Korea

Shin

Jhee

2021

Asia & Pacific Policy Stud

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Does decentralisation lead to higher citizens' satisfaction with the public services that local governments provide? Despite arguments that decentralisation improves public service delivery, studies have not successfully verified the effects of decentralisation on citizen evaluations of local government services. Given the importance of increased local empowerment in promoting desired public goods, we examine whether the hypothesised advantages of decentralisation on public service delivery still hold when applied to citizens' satisfaction with public services. Specifically, we explore both the direct and indirect impacts of decentralisation on citizens' satisfaction through the mediating impact of the local management capacity in Korea. Based on structural equation modelling, the results indicate that decentralisation has a direct negative impact on public service satisfaction, but its impact is not mediated by local management capacity. Due to Korean citizens' lower expectations regarding decentralisation, citizens' satisfaction is not improved even when local management capacity is increased via higher decentralisation.

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Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization: How Elections and Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods

Cited by 9 publications

References 70 publications

The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem

The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem

National and Sub-National Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19

Better service delivery, more satisfied citizens? The mediating effects of local government management capacity in South Korea

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