The Low Area Probing Detector as a Countermeasure Against Invasive Attacks

Abstract

Abstract-Microprobing allows intercepting data from onchip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers. We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe. Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with respect to false positives is sufficient.

A Unified Memory and Hardware Security Module Based on the Adjustable Switching Window of Resistive Memory

“…Additionally, compared with the unified PUF and TRNG design based on CMOS technology, the intrinsic variations of RRAM in write power and latency increase the difficulty in analyzing the system performance and stealing privacy information by side-channel attack such as differential power attack [34]. For practical applications, probing detection technique [35], power-stable code [36], and compact masking technique [37] can be applied to counter either invasive physical attacks or noninvasive attacks. Therefore, even if a malicious party gets hold of the device, it is very hard to steal the PUF ID from the proposed RRAM-based security module.…”

Design and Implementation of Secure Cryptographic System on Chip for Internet of Things

“…Rahman et al [23] investigated hardware security technologies based on complementary metal-oxidesemiconductors (CMOSs) and analyzed their response coverage for attacks. Weiner et al [24] and Weiner et al [25] proposed a low-area probing detector as a response to micro-probing security threats and compared it with shield or bus encryption methods in terms of area overhead and latency. Lee et al proposed [26] a robust secure shield structure to respond to invasive attacks, such as focused ion beam (FIB) circuit editing.…”

“…Weiner et al [24] and Weiner et al [25] proposed a low-area probing detector as a response to micro-probing security threats Lee et al proposed [26] a robust secure shield structure to respond to invasive attacks Semi-invasive attack Rahman et al [23] using complementary metal-oxide-semiconductors (CMOSs)…”

3D Integration: Another Dimension Toward Hardware Security

“…Semi-or fully-invasive probing, monitoring, fault injection, or even circuit modifications are arguably the most severe threats for hardware security at runtime. Related attacks and various countermeasures have been demonstrated for classical 2D ICs, e.g., see [32], [33], [34] and [35], [36], [37], [38].…”