Three-dimensional ICs promise to significantly extend the scale of system integration and facilitate new-generation electronics. However, progress in commercial 3D ICs has been slow. In addition to technology-related difficulties, industry experts cite the lack of a commercial 3D EDA tool-chain and design standards, high risk associated with a new technology, and high cost of transition from 2D to 3D ICs. To streamline the transition, we explore design styles that reuse existing 2D Intellectual Property (IP) blocks. Currently, these design styles severely limit the placement of Through-Silicon Vias (TSVs) and constrain the reuse of existing 2D IP blocks in 3D ICs. To overcome this problem, we develop a methodology for using TSV islands and novel techniques for clustering nets to connect 2D IP blocks through TSV islands. Our empirical validation demonstrates 3D integration of traditional 2D circuit blocks without modifying their layout for this context.
We have developed a novel approach for creating membrane-spanning protein-based pores. The construction principle is based on using well-defined, circular DNA nanostructures to arrange a precise number of pore-forming protein toxin monomers. We can thereby obtain, for the first time, protein pores with specifically set diameters. We demonstrate this principle by constructing artificial alpha-hemolysin (αHL) pores. The DNA/αHL hybrid nanopores composed of twelve, twenty or twenty-six monomers show stable insertions into lipid bilayers during electrical recordings, along with steady, pore size-dependent current levels. Our approach successfully advances the applicability of nanopores, in particular towards label-free studies of single molecules in large nanoscaled biological structures.
Here we advance the protection of split manufacturing (SM)-based layouts through the judicious and well-controlled handling of interconnects. Initially, we explore the cost-security trade-offs of SM, which are limiting its adoption. Aiming to resolve this issue, we propose effective and efficient strategies to lift nets to the BEOL. Towards this end, we design custom "elevating cells" which we also provide to the community. Further, we define and promote a new metric, Percentage of Netlist Recovery (PNR), which can quantify the resilience against gate-level theft of intellectual property (IP) in a manner more meaningful than established metrics. Our extensive experiments show that we outperform the recent protection schemes regarding security. For example, we reduce the correct connection rate to 0% for commonly considered benchmarks, which is a first in the literature. Besides, we induce reasonably low and controllable overheads on power, performance, and area (PPA). At the same time, we also help to lower the commercial cost incurred by SM. 1 We advocate the terminology "to split after" instead of the commonly used "to split at." For example, "to split at M2" remains ambiguous whether M2 is still within the FEOL or already in the BEOL. Further, the same uncertainty applies to the vias of V12 and V23, i.e., those between M1/M2 and M2/M3, respectively. Our definition for "to split after M2" is that M2 and V12 are still in the FEOL, while the vias of V23 are already in the BEOL.
Split manufacturing is a promising technique to defend against fab-based malicious activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, a network flow-based proximity attack, proposed by Wang et al. (DAC'16) [1], has demonstrated that most prior art on split manufacturing is highly vulnerable. Here in this work, we present two practical layout techniques towards secure split manufacturing: (i) gate-level graph coloring and (ii) clustering of same-type gates. Our approach shows promising results against the advanced proximity attack, lowering its success rate by 5.27x, 3.19x, and 1.73x on average compared to the unprotected layouts when splitting at metal layers M1, M2, and M3, respectively. Also, it largely outperforms previous defense efforts; we observe on average 8x higher resilience when compared to representative prior art. At the same time, extensive simulations on ISCAS'85 and MCNC benchmarks reveal that our techniques incur an acceptable layout overhead. Apart from this empirical study, we provide-for the first time-a theoretical framework for quantifying the layout-level resilience against any proximity-induced information leakage. Towards this end, we leverage the notion of mutual information and provide extensive results to validate our model.
Layout camouflaging can protect the intellectual property of modern circuits. Most prior art, however, incurs excessive layout overheads and necessitates customization of active-device manufacturing processes, i.e., the front-end-of-line (FEOL). As a result, camouflaging has typically been applied selectively, which can ultimately undermine its resilience. Here, we propose a low-cost and generic scheme-full-chip camouflaging can be finally realized without reservations. Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects, i.e., the back-end-ofline (BEOL), through design-time handling for real and dummy wires and vias. To that end, we implement custom, BEOL-centric obfuscation cells, and develop a CAD flow using industrial tools. Our scheme can be applied to any design and technology node without FEOL-level modifications. Considering its BEOL-centric nature, we advocate applying our scheme in conjunction with split manufacturing, to furthermore protect against untrusted fabs. We evaluate our scheme for various designs at the physical, DRC-clean layout level. Our scheme incurs a significantly lower cost than most of the prior art. Notably, for fully camouflaged layouts, we observe average power, performance, and area overheads of 24.96%, 19.06%, and 32.55%, respectively. We conduct a thorough security study addressing the threats (attacks) related to untrustworthy FEOL fabs (proximity attacks) and malicious end-users (SAT-based attacks). An empirical key finding is that only large-scale camouflaging schemes like ours are practically secure against powerful SAT-based attacks. Another key finding is that our scheme hinders both placement-and routing-centric proximity attacks; correct connections are reduced by 7.47X, and complexity is increased by 24.15X, respectively, for such attacks.
Abstract-Layout camouflaging (LC) is a promising technique to protect chip design intellectual property (IP) from reverse engineers. Most prior art, however, cannot leverage the full potential of LC due to excessive overheads and/or their limited scope on an FEOL-centric and accordingly customized manufacturing process. If at all, most existing techniques can be reasonably applied only to selected parts of a chipwe argue that such "small-scale or custom camouflaging" will eventually be circumvented, irrespective of the underlying technique.In this work, we propose a novel LC scheme which is low-cost and generic-full-chip LC can finally be realized without any reservation. Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects (BEOL); it can be readily applied to any design without modifications in the device layer (FEOL). Applied with split manufacturing in conjunction, our approach is the first in the literature to cope with both the FEOL fab and the enduser being untrustworthy. We implement and evaluate our primitives at the (DRC-clean) layout level; our scheme incurs significantly lower cost than most of the previous works. When comparing fully camouflaged to original layouts (i.e., for 100% LC), we observe on average power, performance, and area overheads of 12%, 30%, and 48%, respectively.Here we also show empirically that most existing LC techniques (as well as ours) can only provide proper resilience against powerful SAT attacks once at least 50% of the layout is camouflaged-only large-scale LC is practically secure. As indicated, our approach can deliver even 100% LC at acceptable cost. Finally, we also make our flow publicly available, enabling the community to protect their sensitive designs.
Protecting intellectual property (IP) in electronic circuits has become a serious challenge in recent years. Logic locking/encryption and layout camouflaging are two prominent techniques for IP protection. Most existing approaches, however, particularly those focused on CMOS integration, incur excessive design overheads resulting from their need for additional circuit structures or device-level modifications. This work leverages the innate polymorphism of an emerging spin-based device, called the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch, to simultaneously enable locking and camouflaging within a single instance. Using the GSHE switch, we propose a powerful primitive that enables cloaking all the 16 Boolean functions possible for two inputs. We conduct a comprehensive study using state-of-the-art Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks to demonstrate the superior resilience of the proposed primitive in comparison to several others in the literature. While we tailor the primitive for deterministic computation, it can readily support stochastic computation; we argue that stochastic behavior can break most, if not all, existing SAT attacks. Finally, we discuss the resilience of the primitive against various side-channel attacks as well as invasive monitoring at runtime, which are arguably even more concerning threats than SAT attacks.
Three-dimensional (3D) integration of electronic chips has been advocated by both industry and academia for many years. It is acknowledged as one of the most promising approaches to meet ever-increasing demands on performance, functionality, and power consumption. Furthermore, 3D integration has been shown to be most effective and efficient once large-scale integration is targeted for. However, a multitude of challenges has thus far obstructed the mainstream transition from "classical 2D chips" to such large-scale 3D chips. In this paper, we survey all popular 3D integration options available and advocate that using an interposer as system-level integration backbone would be the most practical for large-scale industrial applications and design reuse. We review major design (automation) challenges and related promising solutions for interposer-based 3D chips in particular, among the other 3D options. Thereby we outline (i) the need for a unified workflow, especially once full-custom design is considered, (ii) the current design-automation solutions and future prospects for both classical (digital) and advanced (heterogeneous) interposer stacks, (iii) the state-of-art and open challenges for testing of 3D chips, and (iv) the challenges of securing hardware in general and the prospects for large-scale and trustworthy 3D chips in particular.
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