The Institutional Presidency in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

This article focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency in six Latin American presidential democracies since the last wave of redemocratization. Institutional presidency refers to the bulk of agencies that operate under direct presidential authority and are in charge of supporting the presidential leadership. We document all structural changes occurring under the umbrella of the president for the period of analysis. We find that the expansion in the number of presidential agencies is a deliberate response to situations of conflict or weakness. It is more likely under coalitional presidentialism—when presidents must share cabinet positions and manage relationships with coalition partners—as well as when presidents implement structural reform policies to face critical economic circumstances.

Las primeras damas como miembros de la élite política

“…La primera dama, cargo usualmente ostentado por la esposa del presidente, pero también por la hija, hermana o alguna pariente de jefes de gobierno, puede jugar un papel clave en los sistemas presidencialistas. Ella forma parte de lo que algunos autores llaman el núcleo estratégico de gobierno (Fernández Ramil y Rivera Urrutia 2012) o presidencia institucional (Inácio y Llanos 2016), en alusión al grupo de agencias y asesores que trabajan bajo la autoridad del presidente, apoyándolo en los procesos de toma de decisiones y de manera independiente al gabinete, ya que ellas tienen su oficina propia. Según Watson (1997: 814), la primera dama no solo juega un rol en la vida personal y social del presidente, sino que también en su vida pública y trayectoria.…”

Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil's Multiparty Presidential Regime

“…These differences between presidential and parliamentary systems have contributed to a fast-growing literature specializing in coalition formation (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Amorim Neto 2006;Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015), governance (Inácio and Llanos 2016;Batista 2013;Siavelis 2016;Inácio and Rezende 2015), management (Raile et al 2011), cost (Pereira et al 2016), and termination (Martínez-Gallardo 2012) in presidentialism. Alemán and Tsebelis (2011) argue that presidents have greater incentives to form multiparty coalitions when the balance of power leans toward the legislature and will include parties ideologically aligned in a way to reduce governing costs and possible policy drift.…”

The Presidential Logic of Government Formation in Latin American Democracies

“…Similar interpretations use this perspective to explain the formation of minority or majority governments (Figueiredo et al 2012;Meireles 2016), the government parties' preferences and the formulation of public policies (Alemán and Saiegh 2007;Altman and Castiglioni 2009), and the endurance of the cabinet (Deheza 1997;Altman 2000;Carlin et al 2014;Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2014). Recent analyses consider the survival of ministers (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñan 2015), the development of the institutional presidency 2 (Inácio and Llanos 2016), and formal (Araújo et al 2016) or informal (Siavelis 2016) rules that affect the decision-making process in multiparty cabinets in Latin American democracies.…”