Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.
Quais fatores determinam a rotatividade dos servidores de confiança do governo federal brasileiro? Este artigo mostra que mudanças partidárias na direção dos ministérios não necessariamente se traduzem em mudanças na composição dos cargos de confiança. Funcionários de confiança com funções de policymaking são mais afetados pela mudança de ministro do que os demais. Além disso, órgãos afetados por escândalos de corrupção tiveram uma taxa de permanência de seus funcionários de confiança maior do que a dos demais órgãos. Fica evidente a necessidade de considerar a policy expertise dos funcionários, medida em tempo de serviço público, para entender a rotatividade. O artigo aponta para a pertinência de estudar as relações "Executivo-Executivo" no Brasil.
The main purpose of this article is to show the relevance of the legislative branch participation in formatting bills originating in the executive. It shows that a strong executive is not necessarily accompanied by a weak legislature. By analyzing the changes the legislative made to executive bills through substitute bills and amendments to the legislation, the study shows that the legislative branch actively participates in drafting policies. By such means, the legislative branch is responsible for nearly 40 percent of the content of the laws promulgated in Brazil. Even when the executive takes steps aiming at controlling the legislative agenda, such as provisional decrees or urgency requests, the rates of legislative change do not decrease. As a result, in spite of the president institutional resources to place its own bills on the agenda, the legislative branch do discuss, analyze and modify the proposals advanced by the executive. An active instead of a passive legislative power emerges from the data shown in this article. (2) e0004 -2/34 Keywordsatin American political systems are recognized as having presidents with broad legislative powers (SANTOS, PÉREZ-LIÑÁN and GARCIA MONTEIRO, 2014). This feature has alerted political scientists to possible deficiencies regarding the legislators' ability to fully exercise their role.Legislatures in these countries are usually defined as weak, or as mere "rubber stamps" of the presidential agenda (COX and MORGENSTERN, 2001;O'DONNELL, 1994).Brazil is a notable example of a presidency with strong legislative powers.The president approves most of the proposals sent to the legislature -with high success rates -and most of the laws come from bills initiated by the executivewith high rates of dominance (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999). The explanations for this success and dominance are based on presidential powers -powers over agenda and discretionary control of appointments and budget (AMORIM NETO, 2000; AMORIM NETO, COX, and MCCUBBINS, 2003; LIMONGI, 1999, 2008;MELO and PEREIRA, 2013;PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2002). In this context, in which the explanations for governability focus exclusively on the ability of the executive to promote it, doubts emerge as to the ability of the legislative branch to fully exercise its functions. This is particularly true when dealing with its main function, which is to assess, debate and produce laws. Strong executive, weak legislature?The presidency in Brazil has broad legislative powers, it is able to issue provisional decrees (medidas provisórias) which have the force of law from the moment of publication and can request urgency for the bills that it proposed, significantly limiting the time for evaluating its proposals by the legislature (45 days in each legislative house). The presidency also has exclusive initiative over budgetary and administrative matters, that is, it has agenda powers. The president also has negative powers and is able to partially or totally veto bills ratified by the legislative power. Furthermore, Brazilian presi...
Resumo: Os efeitos produzidos pelo método de converter votos em cadeiras têm estado no centro do debate brasileiro desde a Constituição de 1988 e a reforma política nunca deixou a agenda do debate político, dentro e fora da academia. Os argumentos, no geral, dizem respeito ao fortalecimento dos partidos e ao aumento da accountability eleitoral. Este artigo se propõe a analisar os efeitos de mudanças dos distritos eleitorais. Essas questões estão inscritas em uma discussão mais ampla sobre os impactos do sistema eleitoral no sistema político, bem como sobre o equilíbrio delicado entre governabilidade e representação.Consequentemente, estão diretamente relacionadas à qualidade do sistema democrático.Palavras-chave: reforma política; partidos políticos; sistema eleitoral; distrito uninominal; lista fechada Abstract: The effects produced by the method to convert votes into legislative seats have been at the center of the debate in Brazil since the 1988 Constitution, and since then political reform has never left the agenda of the political debate, both inside and outside of the university. The arguments are, in general, the strengthening of parties and the increase of electoral accountability.This article proposes to analyze the effects of changing the electoral districts. These issues are inscribed in a larger discussion about the impacts of the electoral system on the political system, as well as about the delicate balance between governability and representation. Consequently, they are directly related to the quality of the democratic system.
A persistência do fenômeno da migração partidária no Brasil levou a ciência política a afirmar que as trocas de legenda teriam um caráter endêmico, que fariam parte das práticas e costumes dos políticos brasileiros. Práticas que comprovariam a prevalência do comportamento individualista dos políticos, os quais, por meio da migração partidária, passaram a alterar a correlação de forças no interior do Parlamento sem o crivo eleitoral
Este texto problematiza o tema da migração partidária de parlamentares e suas conseqüências sobre a representação política, explorando, especialmente, a relação entre o representante e seu partido. A idéia é trazer alguns argumentos iniciais sobre as conseqüências das trocas de legenda por políticos exercendo o mandato, que ultrapasse a perspectiva analítica dos procedimentos ou das regras de conversão de votos em cadeiras, revelando a complexidade do tema e a controvérsia que ele gera.
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