Since the 1990s, many governments in middle and low-income countries have used conditional cash transfers to alleviate poverty. However, the evidence of the electoral consequences of this type of anti-poverty intervention remains inconclusive. Do voters reward politicians when they implement conditional cash transfers? This study conducts a meta-analysis using a sample of 10 randomized controlled trials and regression discontinuity designs (35 estimates from six countries in Latin America and Asia) to address this question. The result shows a positive effect of conditional cash transfers on voter support for the incumbents and no evidence of publication bias in the selected sample. Estimated effect sizes tend to be larger in observational studies, unpublished manuscripts, and articles published in political science. These results provide more conclusive evidence that poor voters also respond to non-clientelistic strategies of electoral targeting in developing countries.

(Batista, 2013; Gaylord e Rennó, 2015; Rennó e Wojcik, 2015) se opõem a essa visão, mostrando que a agenda de políticas do Executivo é um constructo coletivo, ou seja, não é resultante da ação isolada do chefe do gabinete de governo.

ResumoPolíticas redistributivas centralizadas podem induzir resultados desiguais entre os territórios? Respondemos afirmativamente a esta questão, apresentando evidências de que a transferência de renda para indivíduos, promovida por uma política social em que a arrecadação e o gasto são centralizados, como o Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC), não se traduz automaticamente em redistribuição de recursos entre territórios. Embora a adoção de políticas de redistribuição de renda no nível interpessoal seja importante para suavizar as tendências de extrema pobreza, estes ganhos em bem-estar não reduzem mecanicamente as disparidades entre as regiões brasileiras. Nas situações em que fatores exógenos à estrutura fiscal impedem que a alocação de recursos siga a distribuição espacial da necessidade, políticas redistributivas centralizadas podem colaborar para o aumento da desigualdade territorial.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: políticas públicas; transferência de renda; estrutura fiscal; desigualdade territorial; pobreza. I. Introdução1 N a última década, o debate sobre redistribuição de renda e desigualdade entre regiões ganhou proeminência na área de economia política. Passou-se a teorizar sobre os efeitos do agravamento ou da atenuação de desigualdades regionais, tendo como referência o grau observado de centralização das atribuições (1) legislativas, (2) administrativas e (3) fiscais, e seus efeitos sobre a redistribuição de recursos entre territórios 2 . Neste trabalho, a pergunta mais ampla que se pretende responder é: em que medida fatores exógenos à estrutura fiscal contribuem para a distorção do efeito redistributivo entre regiões produzido por políticas de renda centralizadas? Embora parte da literatura que investiga essa temática utilize o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) per capita como dimensão de análise, para economias extremamente desiguais esta medida não consegue captar parte importante da variação nas condições de bem-estar social (Sen 1973;Rocha 1998;Kakwani & Son 2008). Sendo assim, assumimos que o fenômeno da desigualdade territorial deve ser entendido como a capacidade desigual de as regiões em um dado arranjo político proverem recursos de subsistência aos seus cidadãos. Mais especificamente, definimos desigualdade territorial como a concentração desigual de indivíduos vulneráveis em unidades territoriais comparáveis, sendo a vulnerabilidade função do número de indivíduos extremamente pobres em um dado território.Não são desprezíveis as consequências deste fenômeno. Além de produzir efeitos sobre a espacialização da riqueza nacional (Azzoni 2001), a desigualdade entre regiões influencia a dinâmica interna do mercado de trabalho (Manso, Barreto & França 2010) e os fluxos de migração interna (Cunha 2015), afetando a estabilidade política, social e econômica de um determinado país (Levy & Chowdhury 1995). Mesmo que alguns autores sugiram que o aumento médio das rendas vem colaborando para uma tendência de redução das dispari-

This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a noncollegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions.

Violence against women (VAW) affects at least 35% of women worldwide. The need to combat VAW is seemingly noncontroversial: As existing work shows, ideology does not explain governments' propensity to adopt anti-VAW legislation. Yet, effectively implementing anti-VAW legislation requires complex policy frameworks at odds with conservative values. Voters' preferences can meaningfully influence policy outputs, so can electoral conservatism make women more vulnerable to violence? Employing data from 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, we find that conservatism in the electorate is associated with the adoption of fewer anti-VAW policies. With data from a nationally-representative survey of Brazilian respondents (N=2,086), we then show that conservative voters are less likely to prioritize the need for tackling VAW. That is, the adoption of fewer anti-VAW policies in conservative municipalities reflects conservative voters’ policy preferences. Critically, our results suggest that in contexts where the electorate holds conservative preferences, policy responsiveness may incur costs to women's lives.

Access to information about candidates' performance has long stood as a key factor shaping voter behaviour, but establishing how it impacts behaviour in real-world settings has remained challenging. In the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, unpredictable technical glitches caused by the implementation of biometrics as a form of identification led some voters to cast ballots after official tallies started being announced. In addition to providing a source of exogenous variation of information exposure, run-off elections also enable us to distinguish between different mechanisms underlying the impact of information exposure. We find strong support for a vote-switching bandwagon effect: information exposure motivates voters to abandon losing candidates and switch support for the frontrunner – a finding that stands in the second round, when only two candidates compete against each other. These findings provide theoretical nuance and stronger empirical support for the mechanisms underpinning the impact of information exposure on voter behaviour.

Access to information about candidates' performance has long stood as a key factor shaping voter behaviour but establishing how it impacts behaviour in real-world settings has remained challenging. In the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, unpredictable technical glitches caused by the implementation of biometrics as a form of ID led some voters to cast ballots after official tallies started being announced. In addition to providing a source of exogenous variation of information exposure, runoff elections also enable us to distinguish between different mechanisms underlying the impact of information exposure. We find strong support for a vote-switching bandwagon effect: information exposure motivates voters to abandon losing candidates and switch support for the frontrunner-a finding that stands in the second round, when only two candidates compete against each other. These findings provide theoretical nuance and stronger empirical support for the mechanisms underpinning the impact of information exposure on voter behaviour.

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