Iran and Its Two Neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan: Resuming Relationships under America's Suspicious Eyes

Abstract

Abstr actImmediately after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Iran sought to once again resume relationships with its two northern ex-Soviet neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the context of the Karabakh conflict that pitted the two South Caucasian countries against one another, Iran, despite its Shi'a Muslim identity, decided to maintain a neutral stance. This was mostly due to the pro-Turkish and clearly antiIranian stance of the second Azeri president, A. Elchibey, and to the traditional close ties between Iran and Armenia. Since that time, Iranian-Armenian political, economic, and cultural relations have maintained themselves at a high level, while Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have improved, especially at the instigation of the Aliyev family in power in Baku. The difficulty for Yerevan and Baku is that they are both partners of the U.S., which, especially under G. W. Bush's presidency, has not been pleased by the good and fruitful relationships Azerbaijan and especially Armenia maintain with Tehran. The strained Iranian-American relationship puts Yerevan and Baku in an uneasy posture, and the U.S., particularly under G. W. Bush, applied relative pressure on both countries to make them ponder over their cooperation with Iran. The delicate task of Armenia and Azerbaijan is, therefore, to optimise their relationship with both the U.S. and Iran, two major actors, without hurting their respective feelings and, as much as possible, their respective interests.

Iran’s soft power in Azerbaijan: shifting cultural dynamics in the post-Soviet era

“…In recent years, some leaders in the Republic of Azerbaijan harbour a strong support for separatism expressed in terms of unification with Iran's Azerbaijan region, thus threatening Iranian territorial integrity. Predictably, Iran has a significant and genuine concern for the promotion of irredentism (Zarifian 2009).…”

“…Both countries demonstrated willingness to cooperate with each other. Iran promised to contribute to the economic development of Azerbaijan, while the Azerbaijani side was attempting to allay Iranian concerns about irredentism in Azerbaijan (Cornell 2011;Zarifian 2009). The relationship soured with the toppling of Mutalibov and rise of Abulfaz Gadirgulu oghlu Aliyev (Elchibey) to the presidency in June 1992 who pursued an ultra-nationalist and specifically expansionist anti-Iranian policy (Valiyev 2017, 87).…”

İran Dış Politikasında Söylem ile Eylem Uyumsuzluğu: Çeçenistan ve Dağlık Karabağ Örnekleri

“…Bu anlamda Ermenistan'la İran, birbirini izolasyondan kurtarmanın bir aracı olarak görmekteydiler. 67 Ancak netice itibariyle bu işbirliğinden en fazla faydalanan tarafın Ermenistan olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Zira Ermenistan, Azerbaycan'la Dağlık Karabağ yüzünden savaştığı dönemlerde İran'dan hem askeri, hem de ekonomik destek alarak savaşı sürdürebilmiş ve üstünlük kurabilmiştir.…”

US policy in the South Caucasus prior to and after the 2020 Karabakh War in the Context of the Evolving Regional and International Geopolitics

“…Iran, alongside Georgia, was one of the two land corridors connecting Armenia with the world. Despite the fact that Gazprom owns its Armenian part, the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline provides Armenia with a vital alternative for gas supplies (Danielyan 2008;Zarifian 2009;Kochnakyan et al 2014). It has a 2.2 billion cubic meters annual capacity to cover all of Armenia's natural gas needs.…”