Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Abstract

Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensity to avert "double defections" at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: (1) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, (2) initiatory violence targeting insurgents' relatives and (3) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents. Can former insurgents in the service of counter-insurgency paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections 1 of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Despite the fact that "double defections" 2 are a fairly widespread occurrence among paramilitary organizations, few studies have explicitly analysed the phenomenon of defection among insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents. We likewise have a poor understanding of the particular counter-defection measures aimed against side-switchers, 3 i.e. insurgents who switch sides to join their former enemies. While some studies have covered counter-defection mechanisms employed by insurgent groups, 4 no study to date has either empirically or theoretically examined the counter-defection measures used by paramilitaries on side-switchers. Drawing on the case study of Chechnya, this empirical article starts to fill the gap in the extant scholarship on counter-defection mechanisms aimed at both former defectors and double defectors among counter-insurgent paramilitaries. Relying predominantly on previously unpublished first-hand evidence from the early years of the Second Chechen War, it identifies three unique and interwoven mechanisms employed by pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitary units-known as kadyrovtsy-to cement the loyalty of former defectors in order to prevent them from returning to, or supporting, insurgency. The first mechanism is extrajudicial executions of "double-defectors" and their relatives, which were widely practiced by kadyrovtsy as a form of intimidation for other

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