When and How Do Militias Disband? Global Patterns of Pro-Government Militia Demobilization in Civil Wars

Abstract

The research to-date on pro-government militias demonstrates that numerous pro-regime militia groups were actively deployed in civil wars over the last half a century. As hundreds of militia groups emerged amid civil warfare, hundreds more were disbanded, integrated into regular military or transformed into political forces. This study seeks to improve our understanding of global patterns of militia demobilisation. In contrast to the growing body of literature that explores the emergence of militias or examines their relationship with the state, studies on the demise of pro-government militias are notable by their absence. Statistical analysis of 220 pro-government militias involved in 75 civil wars from 1981 to 2011, based on a recent database of progovernment militias, demonstrates that the disappearance of militias has little to do with the termination of armed conflict. This study is first to investigate when and under which conditions militias created to assist governments in fighting civil wars disband.

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

“…Governance, including security provision, by militias and rebel groups has been extensively studied (Weinstein 2006; Arjona 2014; Staniland 2017). In some states, private security provision and low-intensity violence extend well into the post-conflict era, even as state capacity re-emerges (Daly 2016; Manning and Smith 2016; Balcells et al 2015; Aliyev 2019). Private and public security provision are often not mutually exclusive in such contexts.…”

Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias: The Case of Village Guards in Turkey

“…When states face serious internal, locally-supported challenges, they may resort to delegating their monopoly of violence to informal local allies. These local allies, including progovernment militias, can sometimes be crucial for the governments' ability to maintain their monopoly on legitimate violence (Aliyev, 2019a). Collaborating with locals provides a variety of benefits, such as offering the state an extra level of security and improving the battlefield performance of regular armies against insurgents (Carey et al, 2015: Lyall & Wilson, 2009Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004); providing the counterinsurgents with crucial information about geography, insurgent enclaves and intelligence about the identity of insurgents and their supporters (Fearon & Laitin, 2003;Kalyvas, 2006;Lyall, 2010); employing selective violence (Branch & Wood, 2010;Lyall, 2010;Valentino et al, 2004) and distributing benefits (Leites & Wolf, 1970;Shafer, 1988;Wolf, 1967).…”

“…In the rare instances in which the literature on militias moves from this normative debate, the role of militias during peace processes and in post-conflict periods is mostly discussed with reference to the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Alden et al, 2011;Aliyev, 2019aAliyev, , 2018bBerdal &Ucko, 2009;Daly, 2016;Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007;Jentzsch et al, 2015). Despite their qualitative differences from rebel organizations and anti-government militias, however, pro-government militias are usually lumped into the same general category of ex-combatants, and their role in post-conflict processes is analyzed as such.…”

‘No peace, no war’ proponents? How pro-regime militias affect civil war termination and outcomes

“…Relying on militias in counterinsurgency campaigns is also described as a "budget" alternative to deploying more costly special counterinsurgency units and other elements of formal security forces (Carey et al, 2013;Peic, 2014). In addition, militias are well-known for their counterinsurgent capacities, such as access to local knowledge, and ability to disrupt rebel infrastructure and local support networks (Lyall, 2010;Aliyev, 2018a;2018b).…”