Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensity to avert "double defections" at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: (1) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, (2) initiatory violence targeting insurgents' relatives and (3) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents. Can former insurgents in the service of counter-insurgency paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections 1 of individuals who have already "betrayed" once? Despite the fact that "double defections" 2 are a fairly widespread occurrence among paramilitary organizations, few studies have explicitly analysed the phenomenon of defection among insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents. We likewise have a poor understanding of the particular counter-defection measures aimed against side-switchers, 3 i.e. insurgents who switch sides to join their former enemies. While some studies have covered counter-defection mechanisms employed by insurgent groups, 4 no study to date has either empirically or theoretically examined the counter-defection measures used by paramilitaries on side-switchers. Drawing on the case study of Chechnya, this empirical article starts to fill the gap in the extant scholarship on counter-defection mechanisms aimed at both former defectors and double defectors among counter-insurgent paramilitaries. Relying predominantly on previously unpublished first-hand evidence from the early years of the Second Chechen War, it identifies three unique and interwoven mechanisms employed by pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitary units-known as kadyrovtsy-to cement the loyalty of former defectors in order to prevent them from returning to, or supporting, insurgency. The first mechanism is extrajudicial executions of "double-defectors" and their relatives, which were widely practiced by kadyrovtsy as a form of intimidation for other
This article looks into the dangers posed by the return of the North Caucasus militants in Syria and Iraq to the security of the Russian Federation. The article first divides the recruitment of North Caucasian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq into two distinct waves. I argue that the first wave of North Caucasus foreign fighters (2011–2013) chose Syria because they could not fight in the North Caucasus. By contrast, the second wave (2014–2016) openly decided not to fight in their own region, preferring to join an international jihadist front. I then build on the literature about the impact of foreign fighters on domestic insurgencies to analyse the potential impact of these returnees on the regional insurgency in the North Caucasus. I identify four factors conditioning the motivations to return and returnee impact on domestic insurgency: a favourable context for return, an existing network in the region, resonance of the militants’ ideology with the local population, and the will to return to the region. I argue that the greater threat will come from the field commanders from the Second Chechen war exiled in Syria, rather than the more numerous second wave foreign fighters integrated into ISIS.
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