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One of the most striking recent developments in metaethics is the extraordinary revival of non-naturalistic realism about ethical properties. Not too long ago, J. L. Mackie was able to suggest that "No doubt it was an extravagance for [G. E.] Moore to say that "good" is the name of a non-natural quality… " (1977: 32). It would be difficult to be so dismissive today, as a growing number of influential philosophers have recently come to the defense of ethical non-naturalism.1 More importantly, these philosophers have offered sophisticated (and often competing) new ways of conceiving of non-naturalism, new and clarified arguments and motivations for these conceptions, and innovative responses to the central problems that the view has been alleged to face.One such problem is that ethical non-naturalism is unable to explain the supervenience of the ethical, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects.This problem can appear difficult to finesse because the supervenience of the ethical has been a rare locus of near-consensus in metaethics. However, the idea that supervenience poses such a problem for non-naturalism has recently been challenged in a number of important ways. One central barrier to the task of evaluating these challenges is that the problem itself is typically not characterized precisely. In this paper, I propose a relatively precise and purely metaphysical interpretation of the argument that supervenience poses a substantial but not necessarily decisive problem for non-naturalism. I then canvass the prospects of various strategies for rebutting this argument on the non-naturalist"s behalf. Iargue that examining these strategies helps to illuminate the burden posed to non-

The convergence of computing, sensing, and communication technology will soon permit large-scale deployment of self-driving vehicles. This will in turn permit a radical transformation of traffic control technology. This paper makes a case for the importance of addressing questions of social justice in this transformation, and sketches a preliminary framework for doing so. We explain how new forms of traffic control technology have potential implications for several dimensions of social justice, including safety, sustainability, privacy, efficiency, and equal access. Our central focus is on efficiency and equal access as desiderata for traffic control design. We explain the limitations of conventional traffic control in meeting these desiderata, and sketch a preliminary vision for a next-generation traffic control tailored to address better the demands of social justice. One component of this vision is cooperative, hierarchically distributed self-organization among vehicles. Another component of this vision is a priority system enabling selection of priority levels by the user for each vehicle trip in the network, based on the supporting structure of non-monetary credits.

Ohio State University 'Moral twin Earth' thought experiments constitute a central semantic challenge to naturalistic normative realism. this paper first outlines a general framework for understanding the challenge, according to which (i) central normative terms are semantically stable in ways that contrast with many other paradigmatic descriptive terms, and (ii) realists should expect to have a unified metasemantic theory that explains the difference in stability between the normative and descriptive terms in question. the most attractive way of meeting this challenge, we argue, appeals to the idea of reference magnetism. according to this influential idea, some properties are reference magnets, which (roughly) means that they are comparatively easy to refer to. We argue that (together with other plausible assumptions) reference magnetism can provide an attractive explanation of both the general phenomenon of varying semantic stability, and the distinctive semantic stability of normative terms. We illustrate this by showing that reference magnetism can smoothly vindicate plausible judgments about Moral twin Earth cases. We conclude by offering an alternative gloss on our account, for those wary of the metaphysical commitments we propose. the alternative account adapts our proposal to provide a debunking explanation of the apparent semantic stability of normative terms. i t is a striking fact that some important normative terms appear to refer to the same property stably, even given significant changes in speaker usage, and the environment in which speakers use them. For example, the prevailing pattern of application of the term 'ought' has shifted substantially over the last century, but this does not seem to signal a change in the term's referent. this is Contact: Billy Dunaway <

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism. This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon's attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon's view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.

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This chapter explores two central questions in the conceptual ethics of normative inquiry. The first is whether to orient one’s normative inquiry around folk normative concepts (like KNOWLEDGE or IMMORAL) or around theoretical normative concepts (like ADEQUATE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION or PRO TANTO PRACTICAL REASON). The second is whether to orient one’s normative inquiry around concepts whose normative authority is especially accessible to us (such as OUGHT ALL THINGS CONSIDERED), or around concepts whose extension is especially accessible to us (such as BETRAYAL). The chapter aims to make vivid and plausible a range of possible answers to these questions, and important forms of argument that can be used to favor certain answers over others.

Abstract:This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers 'schmagency'-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views.