Against quietist normative realism

Abstract

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism. This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon's attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon's view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.

Evolutionary debunking of morality: epistemological or metaphysical?

“…As is occasionally recognized (e.g. Dancy 2006;McPherson 2011) this is much easier said than done; in my view it has yet to be done. If the distinction between the natural and the non-natural (moral) cannot be drawn then there is no sound basis for applying metaphysical assumptions selectively to the moral or evaluative realm.…”

Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?

“…Error theorists think it is false: they think that concepts like WRONG, SHOULD and IRRATIONAL also ascribe properties that are not instantiated. 13 This point is similar to the objections from "shmeasons" and "counter-reasons" that McPherson (2011) andEnoch (2011) make to quietism. That is no coincidence: if Cuneo and Shafer-Landau deny that the world has to be a certain way for wrongness to exist, their view comes close to being a version of quietism.…”

Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity

“…A similar view has also been defended by Skorupski (2006), who claims that normative propositions have truth conditions and can be true even if they are not in the business of trying to depict any substantial truth-making facts. The best critical investigations of these views so far have been written by Tristram McPherson (2011) and Jonas Olson (forthcoming). McPherson focuses on Scanlon but also acknowledges that his objections apply to Parfit and Nagel too (McPherson 2011, 224, fn.…”