Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity

Abstract

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit's theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.

On Parfit’s Ontology

“…If truth adds little or nothing to a claim, this intuitively suggests truth is weak, not strong, or at least that there are stronger theories available. However, as Suikkanen (2017) has pointed out, there is a more important difficulty for Parfit here 25 . Accepting deflationary theories of truth leave Parfit with a dilemma that reduces his ability to separate his metaethical position from others.…”

“…27Suikkanen (2017, 201) more specifically identifies the resultant view as a conservationist version of error theory.…”

“…28For an example of a theory of truth which does not fall under these three categories, Suikkanen (2017) thinks that Parfit will be forced to adopt primitivism about truth, on which truth is a predicate for which no theory will be forthcoming. I agree with Suikkanen that this is very difficult for Parfit to accept, since acceptance of this would commit him to a sui generis notion of truth which is, at the very least, a cost for the theory.…”

Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism

“…Parfit [2016: 60] may be understood as rejecting a correspondence theory when saying that 'normative claims are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.' However, he doesn't seem to offer an alternative account (see Suikkanen [2017] for a similar point). In short, with the exception of Kramer [2009: ch.…”

Le quasi-réalisme et l’argument de la coïncidence

“… 9 Il est aussi possible de dire que Parfit (2017) et Dworkin (1996) défendent une thèse semblable concernant les implications ontologiques des vérités normatives, mais ils ne font pas appel à la notion de sensibilité morale. Pour une évaluation critique de la position de Parfit, qui peut probablement aussi être appliquée à celle de Dworkin, voir Suikkanen (2017). …”