Authoritatively Normative Concepts

McPherson, Tristram

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0012

Cited by 58 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…35 The distinction that I have in mind is more commonly labeled as "robust" and "merely formal" normativity, though I believe these labels obscure what is at the heart of the distinction, which is the rule that normative considerations ought to play in practical deliberation. Regardless, this distinction appears in Berman 2019, 138;Broome 2013 andCopp 2004;Enoch 2019;Leiter 2015;Lord and Maguire 2016;McPherson 2011McPherson , 2017McPherson , and 2018Plunkett 2019, 113-5;Plunkett andShapiro 2017, 48. Parfit (2011, 144-6) hints at the same sort of thing with his distinction between rule-and reason-involving conceptions of normativity.…”

Section: Varieties Of Normativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules

Kaplan

2021

Ratio Juris

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H. L. A. Hart's "practice theory" of rules is widely thought to face two problems: (1) It fails to account for the normativity of law and (2) it is susceptible to a decisive counterexample dating back to Warnock (1971). In this paper, I offer solutions to both problems. In response to (2), I appeal to an old, but underappreciated, distinction made by Rawls (1955) and argue that the counterexample is no counterexample at all. In response to (1), I apply a newly popular distinction regarding the nature of law's normativity and argue that Hart's practice theory has no problem accounting for the normativity of law.

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Section: Varieties Of Normativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules

Kaplan

2021

Ratio Juris

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“…Prominent examples include Broome (2013), Davidson (1980), Gibbard (1992), Korsgaard (1996), Parfit (2011) and Williams (1965) (the source of the term 'deliberative ''ought'''). For useful recent discussions see Kiesewetter (2017), Lord (2015), McPherson (2018) and Schroeder (2011a. ) Some doubt there is any such 'ought' (Tiffany 2007;Baker 2018).…”

Section: Good Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

Way

2020

Philos Stud

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Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

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“…For these labels, see Scanlon (1998), Parfit (2011), andWedgwood (2004), respectively. For more such labels, and why they can be misleading, see McPherson (2018).…”

Section: Normative Thoughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For worries about our ability to cash out the metaphor, see Copp (2005a;2005b), Tiffany (2007), Baker (2018). Recent replies to these challenges include McPherson (2018) and Wodak (2019).…”

Section: Normative Thoughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist

McPherson¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This paper aims to illuminate the deep explanatory challenge to normative realism that underlies two familiar objections to that view. According to the first objection, the realist cannot explain the distinctive deliberative significance of our normative thought. According to the second objection, the realist cannot explain how our normative thought has determinate representational content. This paper argues that, properly understood, these seemingly distinct objections are in fact mutually reinforcing sides of a single deep challenge to the realist's ability to explain what we know about our normative thought: the deliberation/representation challenge. I spell out this challenge and suggest that it is an excellent candidate for the deepest problem in the philosophy of mind for the normative realist. This paper also shows that addressing this challenge to the normative realist-as opposed to the moral realistis illuminating. There are natural and promising replies to each side of the challenge available to the moral realist that are not available to the normative realist. But focusing on the challenge to the normative realist helps us to see that these replies fail to address the challenge in its deepest and most general form.C ontroversy about the credibility of normative realism is endemic to contemporary metaethics. Some take realism to be "obviously, the default position," while others, to put it mildly, do not. 1,2 In the face of such persistent

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Authoritatively Normative Concepts

Cited by 58 publications

References 6 publications

In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules

In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist

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