A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

Abstract

Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

Forever fitting feelings

“…It's fitting to admire the admirable, blame the blameworthy, and desire the desirable. But whether a person is admirable or blameworthy, or an outcome desirable, doesn't in general depend on your perspective: as Way (2021) points out, a person might be admirable or blameworthy, or an outcome desirable, due to facts of which you're unaware (3186). It follows that the fittingness of admiration, blame, and desire, also isn't constrained by your epistemic position.…”

“…Marušić (2018Marušić ( , 2020 and Na'aman (2021) make this point, using different examples.15 My thinking about this gambit, and my favored responses to it, are inspired and informed by(Way, 2021).16 These examples are adapted from(Way, 2021: 3187).…”

Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief

“…SeeWay (2020) for a defense ofKnowledge. McHugh (2014: 182-183) considers Knowledge as an alternative to Truth, without committing himself to it.…”