Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem

Björnsson, Gunnar; McPherson, Tristram

doi:10.1093/mind/fzu031

Cited by 33 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Belief-Desire Reduction: A wide variety of propositional attitudes have a functional 4 For noncognitivist accounts of belief, see Gibbard (1990Gibbard ( , 2003; Köhler (2013); Björnsson and McPherson (2014). For noncognitivist theories of credence, see Sepielli (2012); Eriksson and Olinder (2016); Ridge (2018).…”

Section: The Game Planmentioning

confidence: 99%

A solution to the many attitudes problem

Beddor

2019

Philos Stud

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According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great e ort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.

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Section: The Game Planmentioning

confidence: 99%

A solution to the many attitudes problem

Beddor

2019

Philos Stud

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“…in light of these kinds of concerns, Gibbard (1993: 318-319;2003: 152-158) has proposed that the mismatch pattern arises when the motivationally efficacious states that constitute normative judgments become somehow distorted, such that their motivational effects are blocked (see also Björnsson & McPherson 2014;eriksson 2014;Toppinen 2015;cf. ridge 2015;Strandberg 2012).…”

Section: Do Noncognitivists Do Better?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

Cline¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. in this paper, i draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two kinds of process: intuitive-affective processes and domain-general reasoning. When produced by the first kind of process, motivation and judgment tend to align. When produced by the second kind, motivation and judgment might not align. Since the first kind of process is the most common pathway of normative belief formation, normative judgments are typically accompanied by aligning motivation. This proposal enables cognitivists to explain the intimate link between normative judgment and motivation, thereby removing the major obstacle to interpreting normative statements truth-conditionally.

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“…If correct, this picture might explain many of our judgments about who is making genuine 'ethical judgments'. But there may be no specific psychological states that our interlocutors would need to be in to make such engagement possible (compare Björnsson and McPherson 2014).…”

Section: Complications: Mind and Languagementioning

confidence: 99%