The post-Cold War debate among positivist and post-positivist theorists of international security -particularly realists, liberals and constructivists -has not diminished. Both realism and constructivism have now been established as the key intellectual competitors in Southeast Asian security studies. Following a brief intellectual history of Southeast Asian security studies, this paper reviews the major works of two political scientists who are leading authorities: Michael Leifer, a professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science and a realist; and Amitav Acharya, a professor at York University and a constructivist. This review essay makes the following argument: constructivism is more insightful than balance-ofpower realism, but it is more likely to conform to a sophisticated balanceof-threat theory -a form of 'minimalist' or 'soft' realism -which can help explain the daunting tasks of security-community building.

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This article seeks to shed light on how and why the Cambodian People’s Party (the CPP) emerged and became dominant in the multi-party system formally introduced to Cambodia when the United Nations intervened in the early 1990s. Historical factors, relative power, leadership, and tactics matter a great deal. Hun Sen has been in power for more than 30 years and his effectiveness can be attributed to three tactics: coercion, co-option, and control. The post-Cold War environment also made it possible for the CPP government to use these tactics successfully, as major powers preferred to work with Hun Sen or did little to undermine him.

This article argues that Southeast Asia is a region where uneven political development presents a theoretical challenge to the study of regime change and continuity in the academic field of comparative politics. Of the 11 political regimes, only Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Indonesia can now be considered liberally democratic. However, these democracies are far from consolidated. The other eight regimes range from soft dictatorships to electoral authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies. This article seeks to explain why no single theory adequately explains regime change and continuity in this region. Impediments to democratisation are many – one of which is the fact that traditional and undemocratic institutions remain strong and that transitions to civilian rule remain vulnerable to other powerful state institutions, most notably the armed forces.

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This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are 'smart' as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not 'intelligent' enough to change political leaders' alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter's coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

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