Party System Institutionalization in Asia 2014
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781107300385.009
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Party and Party System Institutionalization in Cambodia

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Cited by 7 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The CPP's success in turning itself into the dominant party cannot be explained without looking at how the party dominated state institutions from early on. Comparatively, the CPP as a party is older and stronger than any of the opposition parties and has more than 30 years to develop its organizational structure and weaken intra-party factionalism (Peou, 2014(Peou, , 2017a.…”
Section: Institutional Control As a Political Tacticmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The CPP's success in turning itself into the dominant party cannot be explained without looking at how the party dominated state institutions from early on. Comparatively, the CPP as a party is older and stronger than any of the opposition parties and has more than 30 years to develop its organizational structure and weaken intra-party factionalism (Peou, 2014(Peou, , 2017a.…”
Section: Institutional Control As a Political Tacticmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Winning national elections has allowed the CPP to take control of the National Assembly and the Senate. Much has been written about this (Peou, 2011(Peou, , 2014, but it is important to stress that Cambodia has (since the violent putsch in July 1997) held a number of national assembly, Senate, and commune elections, but all of them have resulted in the CPP's greater control of the legislature. The CPP's political control of the Senate and the communes remains relatively unchanged.…”
Section: Institutional Control As a Political Tacticmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…No clear evidence shows that the CPP government is prepared to lose elections in the foreseeable future and to transfer power peacefully. Democratic institutions in Cambodia remain highly underdeveloped or fragile despite institution building efforts over the past few decades (Peou 2014b). Since the 2013 elections, Hun Sen has done his best to consolidate and personalize power.…”
Section: Peace Though Democracy and Retributive Justice?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mit der Gründung der bürgerlichen Demokratischen Partei und der Liberalen Partei, der kommunistischen Volksrevolutionären Partei (KPRP), die 1951 aus der Indochinesischen Kommunistischen Partei hervorging, und der royalistischen Sammlungsbewegung Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Volkssozialistische Gemeinschaft) hatten sich Mitte der 1950er Jahre jene drei politischen Strömungen organisiert, die auch nach 1991 die Struktur des Parteiensystems grundlegend geprägt haben (Karbaum 2008; De Zeuuw 2010; Peou 2014). Mit der Gründung der bürgerlichen Demokratischen Partei und der Liberalen Partei, der kommunistischen Volksrevolutionären Partei (KPRP), die 1951 aus der Indochinesischen Kommunistischen Partei hervorging, und der royalistischen Sammlungsbewegung Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Volkssozialistische Gemeinschaft) hatten sich Mitte der 1950er Jahre jene drei politischen Strömungen organisiert, die auch nach 1991 die Struktur des Parteiensystems grundlegend geprägt haben (Karbaum 2008; De Zeuuw 2010; Peou 2014).…”
Section: Parteien Und Parteiensystemunclassified
“…Ähnlich wie die FUNCINPEC ist auch die SRP/CNRP schwach institutionalisiert (Peou 2014). Die Partei ging 1998 aus der Kambodschanischen Nationalpartei hervor, welche sich ihrerseits 1995 von der FUNCINPEC gelöst hatte.…”
Section: Parteien Und Parteiensystemunclassified