Why 'Smart' Sanctions Still Cause Human Insecurity

Abstract

This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are 'smart' as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not 'intelligent' enough to change political leaders' alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter's coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

Reconsidering contemporary classifications of sanctions in the light of the Russia sanctions regime

“…Opinions are voiced that smart sanctions are even less effective than comprehensive embargoes (Drezner, 2011). The cases of the sanctions regimes against Myanmar and North Korea show that smart sanctions may prove to be quite ineffective and have some adverse side effects (Peou, 2019). The fact that the USA frequently takes a leading role in the introduction of sanctions regime may have significant negative implications (Bandeira, 2019).…”

Sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos a Venezuela

“…Estas medidas económicas han llegado a ser consideradas como selectivas e inteligentes, porque pretenden el cambio del comportamiento del líder y minimizan los daños a la población civil. Usualmente, las medidas se dirigen a individuos o a grupos terroristas o agresores de derechos humanos no aprobados por los miembros de la comunidad internacional y se dirigen a afectar los activos financieros o commodities (Peou, 2019). Se presumen inteligentes porque afectan solo a una persona o a un grupo determinado, sin embargo, como consecuencia, puede ocurrir que, una vez se afecte el objetivo económico al que va dirigido, se genere un efecto de cascada que cree dificultades socioeconómicas en la población, llevando a los civiles a rebelarse contra el líder.…”

“…La imposición de estas sanciones inteligentes y selectivas a través del congelamiento de activos financieros, embargos o prohibiciones comerciales no resulta lo suficientemente perjudicial para su objetivo, pero, en cambio, puede promover la violencia en el país en detrimento de la democracia y del Estado de derecho (Carneiro y Elden, 2009). Además, en el ámbito comercial puede causar un aislamiento frente al cual la interdependencia misma es ineficiente, lo que origina el retraimiento del país objetivo del comercio internacional (Peou, 2019).…”

“…Los resultados que han tenido estas medidas económicas no han sido selectivas ni inteligentes como plantea Peou (2019). Por el contrario, sí han influido notoriamente en el desarrollo socioeconómico, fragmentando políticamente la sociedad y la región.…”

Interparty and Intraparty Factionalism in Cambodian Politics

“…2 What this also suggests is that his regime is unlikely to enhance his political legitimacy now still based largely on economic growth, which remains unsustainable because of threats of economic sanctions from Western democracies, which have been increasingly alarmed by the CPP’s aggressive monopolisation of power (Peou, 2019b). But economic sanctions are unlikely to stop CPP leaders’ determination to stay in power because of authoritarian elites’ ability to “outsmart” sanctions-sender actors, even if it means that staying in power would cause much suffering to their own ordinary citizens (Peou, 2019a).…”