Was 9/11 the opening salvo in a new age of terrorism? Some argue that this act ushered in a more chaotic world. Others contend an increased focus on terrorism in the past 15 years is the result of conflating terrorist activity with insurgency. We shed light on these claims by analyzing data on domestic and transnational terrorist incidence from 1989 to 2014. The evidence suggests that the years since 9/11 have been different from those preceding them. Once the prevalence of conflicts is accounted for, the post-9/11 era is a significantly less terror prone period than the years before it. A country not suffering civil conflict was upwards of 60 percent more likely to experience terrorism prior to or during the year 2001 than since. However, the opposite trend holds for those countries with a higher proportion of Muslims. Prior to 2001, countries with higher Muslim populations experienced less domestic terrorism. Since 9/11, these countries have experienced significantly more terrorism – both domestic and international – than they had previously.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-0-8330-9848-1 For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2037Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Staff Sgt. Bertha A. Flores/U.S. Army; JoeLena/Getty Images; U.S. Department of Defense; Senior Airman James Richardson/U.S. Air Forceiii PrefaceThis report documents the results of the project "Limited InterventionsWill They Work?" The project analyzed the strategic effects of low-cost and small-footprint military options across a range of irregular warfare operations and in a range of operational environments. The findings should be of interest to a wide audience in the foreign policy and defense communities with an interest in the stabilization of fragile states, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and related issues. The report should be of particular interest to strategists, force planners, and the special operations community.This research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146862. SummaryFollowing the protracted and costly counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has turned to lower-cost, lightor small-footprint options. These options emphasize airpower and limited commit...

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Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (e.g., resource-rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a "weak state." This allows rivals to seize portions of the government's territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post-Cold War African dyads from 1990 to 2006.