Limited Intervention: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Limited Stabilization, Limited Strike, and Containment Operations

Abstract

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-0-8330-9848-1 For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2037Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Staff Sgt. Bertha A. Flores/U.S. Army; JoeLena/Getty Images; U.S. Department of Defense; Senior Airman James Richardson/U.S. Air Forceiii PrefaceThis report documents the results of the project "Limited InterventionsWill They Work?" The project analyzed the strategic effects of low-cost and small-footprint military options across a range of irregular warfare operations and in a range of operational environments. The findings should be of interest to a wide audience in the foreign policy and defense communities with an interest in the stabilization of fragile states, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and related issues. The report should be of particular interest to strategists, force planners, and the special operations community.This research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146862. SummaryFollowing the protracted and costly counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has turned to lower-cost, lightor small-footprint options. These options emphasize airpower and limited commit...

Assessing Trade-Offs in U.S. Military Intervention Decisions: Whether, When, and with What Size Force to Intervene

“…57 The extent to which a large intervention force is able to help the party it is supporting militarily could speed progress toward a resolution of the conflict. 58 Larger interventions are also associated with lower fatality levels (experienced and caused), at least during nation-building. 59 However, past experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere has underscored the fact that having a large force size might be necessary for conflict termination and deescalation but is by no means sufficient.…”

“…57 Despite a close historical relationship with the Colombian government, the United States opted not to intervene to halt the violence directly, although it provided the government with substantial military and economic aid. 58 Beyond a desire for stability and continued partnership with Colombia, the United States was also concerned with a potential upsurge in support for communism. After a decade of intense violence, the Liberals and Conservatives reached a power-sharing arrangement that returned a measure of stability to the country and kept it closely aligned with the United States.…”

“…Watts, Johnston, et al, 2017.61 Kilcullen, 2009; Patrick T. Brandt, T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicolai Petrovsky, and Dagmar Radin, "When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars," Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No.…”

“…59, No. 6, 2015; Charles T. Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012.62Watts, Johnston, et al, 2017.…”

Forecasting Demand for U.S. Ground Forces: Assessing Future Trends in Armed Conflict and U.S. Military Interventions

“…20, No. 4, 2011; andStephen Watts, Patrick B. Johnston, Jennifer Kavanagh, Sean M. Zeigler, Bryan Frederick, Trevor Johnston, Karl P. Mueller, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Nathan Chandler, Meagan L. Smith, Alexander Stephenson, and Julia A. Thompson, Limited Intervention: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Limited Stabilization, Limited Strike, and Containment Operations, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2037-A, 2017b. In this analysis, we do not need a precise ratio between stabilizing forces and the local populations; for our purposes, it is sufficient to note that larger populations generally require much larger forces to stabilize.…”