Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the dataset was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time.

Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables included, and offer comparisons with the Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot dataset on sanctions that has been frequently used in previous research. We also present simple statistical relationships between sanctions outcomes and some of the variables commonly believed to affect sanctions success.

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions ''work'' more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testing utilizing the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data. Somewhat surprisingly, the analyses using these new data support the intuition of policymakers; that is, multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions. Our results do support one theoretical argument, based on spatial models, that we test. This explanation holds that whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved. Our analyses provide support for these hypotheses.On October 15, 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice claimed that the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution threatening to impose sanctions on North Korea would serve as a powerful tool to induce Pyongyang to cease its development of nuclear technology. Rice stated that the vote demonstrated a ''unity of purpose,'' 1 and that the participation of Russia and China made the threat of sanctions both more powerful and more credible. As in this case, policymakers often advocate the use of multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions, arguing that a coalition of states can create stronger signals to a target government and impose greater costs if the target does not comply with the senders' demands. Even policymakers typically in favor of unilateral approaches to foreign policy, such as US Vice President Richard Cheney, often argue that unilateral sanctions ''almost never work. '' 2 While this argument is quite intuitive and apparently reasonable, systematic empirical research consistently demonstrates the opposite pattern: unilateral sanctions appear much more effective than do multilateral efforts (Hufbauer, Schott, and

This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA’s continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. However, the model demonstrates that while military aid does not accomplish the US goal of disarming terrorists, military aid is effective at preventing host states from negotiating with terrorist organizations. The provision of military aid provides a disincentive for host states to reach a negotiated settlement with terrorist groups, and therefore prevents terrorist organizations from altering the status quo that is favorable to the USA. This suggests that while military aid may not be effective at actually disarming terrorist groups, it can be effective at keeping terrorist groups out of power. These hypotheses are tested using the Jones & Libicki (2008) data on terrorism from 1997 to 2006. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model.

One of the most striking features of insurgency is how infrequently the two sides attempt peaceful negotiation. Very often, the government refuses to grant the insurgents legitimacy as a bargaining partner. Yet, some conflicts do reach a point at which the two sides open negotiation. This article seeks to develop an explanation of the timing of negotiation during insurgency. Using a game theoretic model, this article concludes that for negotiation to take place, the insurgents must be able to survive their initial vulnerability. In the early stages of the insurgency, the government is likely to use all of its resources to repress the group. In most cases, such efforts will be successful. However, if the insurgency persists, the insurgents' capability will grow with time. By continuing to fight the government, the insurgents will begin adapting to government tactics. If the insurgents survive a certain period of fighting, a window for negotiation is likely to emerge. If the government fails to repress the insurgents early, it may be forced to negotiate under less favorable circumstances later in the conflict. However, if negotiations fail, the window will close, owing to the increasing power of the insurgents. If the insurgents develop a belief of invulnerability, the group will no longer believe it needs to negotiate with the government. These predictions are tested using duration analysis on a set of insurgencies from the State Failure Data from 1955 to 2001.