The "hearts and minds" model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unforeseen announcement of the resignation of Iraq's divisive prime minister in August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the country. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq's displeased Sunni Arab minority to shift support from the violent opposition to the government. In line with our argument, this realignment was due to rising optimism among Sunni Arabs that the new government would provide services and public goods-specifically security, electricity, and jobs.
In this article, the history of regulation in pensions in the United Kingdom is analysed, in particular with respect to defined benefit occupational pension schemes. A framework of criteria for effective legislation is developed. The original prudent person rule provided a good framework for legislation, but most subsequent regulation that has been enacted does not meet our criteria. Recently regulation has increased the cost and risk of individual schemes and the systemic risk in the system as a whole. The article finds that, in totality, regulation has been disastrous for these schemes, contributing to their demise. The article concludes by briefly outlining how effective regulation might have developed to produce a flexible and resilient system.
Power-sharing arrangements between a leader and a popular outsider can be mutually beneficial and threatening. The literature has focused primarily on the former’s trade-off where a leader gains legitimacy when sharing power with a respected outsider but also subsequently creates a rival who could challenge their rule. Yet this outsider also faces a simultaneous trade-off between power and credibility in acquiescing to the leadership. I incorporate both coinciding trade-offs in developing a formal model to examine such power-sharing arrangements which have been prevalent historically and currently. I illustrate a ‘discontinuity’ in optimal power sharing where a leader either shares nothing or shares a specific amount to compensate the rival for the rival’s lost credibility. Counterintuitively, I further show that the leader should share more power with less trustworthy rivals to reduce their strong incentives to challenge. I then revisit the Investiture Controversy in medieval Europe using these insights from the model.
This paper aims to present a new concept of automatic tank filling system. A typical household water tank uses a ball mechanism to control the filling of water in the tank. The process is not automatic as the motor used has to be operated manually. The automatic systems uses costly electronic sensors. The new concept which is being presented is without the use of any electronic component. The idea behind the water tank automation is that as soon the water level goes down at 10%, the motor automatically switches on and as soon the water level reaches to 90% of the total height, the motor automatically switches off. This process is controlled and automated using a programmable logic controller (PLC) through a ladder logic. Water tank automation will aid in an increased energy saving.
The state sponsorship of terrorist groups poses significant risks to international security. Accordingly, a growing body of scholarship focuses on understanding different aspects of the relationship between the patron state, the sponsored terrorist group, and the target state. This chapter first reviews the findings and arguments in this literature, exploring both the theoretical and empirical work over the strategic dynamics of and the effects of state support. Existing research contains numerous insights and provides some counterintuitive advances to our understanding of the different manifestations of sponsorship, the rationale for sponsorship, and the impact of sponsorship on both the terrorist group and the target state. Yet, there is much more work that remains to be done in this field. Specifically, we propose that further study on the connections between sponsorship and other important security issues in world politics is necessary to better understand the broader role that sponsorship plays in international relations. To promote this end, we empirically demonstrate the connection between territorial disputes, the state sponsorship of militant groups, and the onset of interstate conflict. This evidence is preliminary but opens a potentially promising new avenue for research on the effects of state sponsorship of terrorist groups.
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