This issue of the Journal of Theoretical Politics contains five original articles. Two of the articles discuss elections and, among other connections, share a focus on the effect of crises on policy outcomes. The other three articles consider key questions about institutional design. Coming from different substantive corners of political science, all three articles share a concern with sustaining cooperative outcomes in the face of potentially costly coordination failures. As editors, we view this set of articles as indicative of the type of research we want the Journal of Theoretical Politics to support and publish: analytical theoretical models applied to substantive concerns within political science. As we believe each of these contributions demonstrates, analytical models are important for clarifying and guiding the broader understanding of political phenomena. In 'Clarity or collaboration: Balancing competing aims in bureaucratic design', Christopher Carrigan develops a theory of institutional design that combines the possibility of multiple tasks with the notion of goal ambiguity in delegation settings. Goal ambiguity is modelled as the agent's (or agents') uncertainty about which of two tasks is considered more important by the principal. The theory provides an important and elegant insight into how the impact of goal ambiguity on the optimal design choice (i.e., whether to task a single agent with both tasks or separate the responsibility across two agents) is driven by the principal's desire for coordination of the performances of the two tasks. Carrigan's theory also represents an important contribution to expanding the applicability and scope of the principal-agent literature on institutional design. In 'The electoral strategies of a populist candidate: Does charisma discourage experience and encourage extremism?', Gilles Serra presents a theory of elections that blends both personality traits and populist electoral appeals. The theory