We investigate how aspects of "civil service" systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship-specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy-motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis-à-vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; "neutral competence" is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-motivated bureaucrats.
In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal models to explicate the rationale for and effects of myriad aspects of bureaucratic institutions. Whereas previous waves of formal modeling on bureaucratic structure emphasized bureaucracy as a device for making policy commitments last, more recent formal research has grappled with information asymmetries and more explicitly considered the principal-agent relationship between bureaucracies and political authorities. We review several major recent themes in this literature, particularly the effects and development of bureaucratic hierarchies, the agency dilemmas inherent when policy-making authority is delegated to bureaucrats, and the effects of institutional structure on the development and sharing of expertise and capacity in bureaucracies.
In this article, I present an equilibrium model of party government within a two-party legislature. The theory is predicated upon members of the majority party having potentially conflicting individual and collective interests. In response to this potential conflict, the members of the majority party endogenously choose a degree of control to grant to their leadership. The equilibrium level of party strength is decreasing in the size of the majority party and increasing in the strength of opposition among members of the minority party. The theory implies that the average performance of W-Nominate estimates of majority party members' ideal points will be a decreasing function of the size of the majority party while the performance of these estimates for members of the minority party will not be affected by the size of the majority party.
This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters' strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters' utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D72, D50, D60.
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